Attentional competition between visual stimuli in healthy individuals and neurological patients by Watling, Rosamond
Attentional competition between visual stimuli 
in healthy individuals and neurological patients  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Thesis submitted for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy 
 
By 
 
Rosamond Elizabeth Watling 
 
 
December 2012 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Department of Psychology, Goldsmiths College 
 
  
 2 
I hereby declare that this submission is my own work and that, to the best of my 
knowledge and belief, it contains no material previously published or written by 
another neither person, nor material which to a substantial extent has been accepted 
for the award of any other degree or diploma of the university or any other institute 
of learning. 
 
 
Date: 17
th
 December 2012 
 
 
Name: Rosamond Elizabeth Watling 
 
 
Signed: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The work presented in this thesis has led to the following publications: 
 
Peer-reviewed manuscripts: 
Watling, R., Danckert, J., Linnell, K., and Cocchini, G. (2013). Extinction and anti-
extinction: the “attentional waiting” hypothesis. Neuropsychology, 27, 275-279.* 
 
A second paper on Experiments 3 and 4 is in preparation. 
 
 
Conference proceedings: 
 
Watling, R., Cocchini, G. and Danckert, J. (2010, 22-24 September). Anti-extinction 
and binding of targets by time: a single case study.   Poster session presented at the 
Second Meeting of the Federation of the European Societies of Neuropsychology 
(ESN), Amsterdam, Netherlands. 
 
 
 
 
 
* Presented in Appendix A of this thesis. 
 3 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
For Mike  
  
 
 4 
Abstract 
 
 
In the rich and complex visual environment that surrounds us, visual stimuli 
compete for attention in a limited capacity perceptual system (Broadbent, 1958; 
Duncan, 1980; Treisman, 1969).  In this competition, the winners reach perceptual 
awareness and the losers are disregarded and fail to reach awareness (Ward, Goodrich 
& Driver, 1994; Mattingley, Davis & Driver, 1997).  Theories of visual attention can 
be guided and informed by the study of brain damaged patients who show specific 
impairments in attending to visual stimuli, in particular visual extinction, commonly 
following right hemisphere damage and resulting in an inability to perceive a 
contralesional stimulus when it appears with a simultaneous ipsilesional item, but no 
such impairment when it appears alone.  The studies reported in this thesis created an 
extinction-like pattern of errors in healthy volunteers using a bottom-up (stimulus-
driven) paradigm when a simple task of detection was employed.  When a more 
demanding task of stimulus identification employed, both in bottom-up and top-down 
(cueing) paradigms, a rarely previously described pattern of anti-extinction was 
observed, in which perception of a weaker item was facilitated (rather than impaired) 
by a simultaneous ‘stronger’ item in the display.  Extinction and anti-extinction were 
then explored in brain damaged patients.  A novel ‘attentional waiting’ hypothesis 
was discussed, which proposes that extinction and anti-extinction may be part of the 
same attentional mechanism where the latter manifestation may be observed in larger 
proportion of patients showing extinction if duration of stimuli is increased. 
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“Assuming, as is natural, that of two simultaneous sensory 
stimuli, the stronger always tends to extrude the weaker from 
consciousness, is it conceivable or not that one should be able 
to discern the objects coinstantaneously in the same individual 
time?”  (Aristotle, trans. 2006, p.25)  
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 1.1 A brief overview of attention 
 
1.1.1 What is attention? 
What is attention?  The question has a semblance of paradox about it because, 
whilst the word is used frequently in everyday parlance, as a phenomenon its 
definition is equivocal.  Hunter (2009) asks whether it is an energy, a function, a 
power or a relationship.  Loosely, it can be described as an adaptive mechanism that 
allows us to focus on one aspect of the environment whilst ignoring others. On closer 
reflection though, it seems to have a number of specific features including selection 
on the bases of location and object properties, selection primed by expectation, 
automatic processes triggered by environmental changes and re-orienting of attention 
after distraction.  A significant feature of attention is that its capacity is limited.  Take 
a scenario that is familiar to most of us today: waiting to reclaim one’s luggage from 
a baggage carousel at an airport.  Having established the baggage reclaim area where 
the carousel is located, we are able to select one conveyor belt over others on the 
basis of its spatial location.  We keep looking at one point on the moving conveyor 
belt, hoping to see our suitcase.  We have an expectation of what the suitcase will 
look like, driven by top-down processes.  A similar looking case appears – the same 
colour and size as the one we are expecting – and, momentarily, we are misled into 
thinking this is our case: the perceptual input has triggered, bottom-up, two of the 
attributes (colour and size) that have been primed by our expectations.  Whilst we are 
focused on one area of the conveyor belt a loud alarm bell rings and we are distracted 
and look around the arrivals area for any sign of impending danger: an automatic 
process has detected an important environmental change outside the current focus of 
attention and drawn attention to it.  The ringing stops and a loudspeaker 
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announcement informs us that there is no cause for alarm, so we re-engage our 
attention to where it was before: we have remembered what we were doing and can 
direct our attention back to the original task.  If our suitcase fails to appear after more 
than a few more minutes it becomes increasingly difficult to stop our attention from 
wandering; we start to observe other passengers and their luggage: attentional 
capacity is limited.  After a while, our suitcase appears and we move to grasp it from 
the conveyor belt: our attention has shifted from the location of the conveyor belt to 
the suitcase itself; it has changed from being location-based to object-based.  In our 
everyday interactions with the visual world, attention is guided both by bottom-up 
(stimulus-driven) factors, such as colour, shape and brightness, and top-down 
(cognitive) factors, for example current goals and expectations, and prior knowledge. 
 
1.1.2 Historical overview 
The visual system is perhaps the most important of our sensory systems in 
terms of providing us with detailed information about the world around us, and the 
processes underlying the interpretation of this information have been the foci of many 
decades of research.  Probably the earliest recorded thoughts on attention date back to 
Aristotle’s contemplations, in which he makes explicit reference to the difficulty in 
attending to more than one stimulus at a time (Aristotle, trans. 2006).  The long-held 
Aristotelian conception of the soul, which was believed to be the capacity of a living 
thing to interact with the world, and which incorporated perception and intellect, was 
replaced in the seventeenth century by Cartesian dualism.  Descartes made a 
distinction between the mind (responsible for consciousness and self-awareness) and 
the brain (the seat of intelligence).   
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When psychology emerged as a discipline during the mid eighteenth century, 
Wolff (1738, cited in Mole (2009) devoted an entire section to the topic of attention, 
marking the introduction of attention to psychology as a major field.  Despite the fact 
that Wolff’s observations were not empirically tested, he nevertheless made a 
significant contribution to the thinking on cognitive processes at the time.  A number 
of textbooks followed (e.g. Bonnet, 1755; Abel, 1786) that addressed the topic of 
attention.  According to Hatfield (1988), little is known about the experimental 
techniques in psychology that doubtless emerged in the early nineteenth century, but 
it is agreed that psychological theory of the time followed a strong continuity from 
the writings of eighteenth century psychologists.  It was Titchener (1908) who 
brought the study of attention to the fore by writing of the realisation that, “the 
doctrine of attention is the nerve of the whole psychological system” (1908, p. 173, as 
cited in Hatfield, 1988).  He noted that the onset of a sudden movement or change 
could bring about an involuntary shift of attention and, conversely, that the 
termination of a previously unnoticed stimulus could also summon attention.  Unlike 
some earlier theorists (e.g. Bonnet, 1755, cited in Hatfield, 1988; Abel, 1786, cited in 
Hatfield, 1988) who asserted multiple degrees of attention, Titchener postulated that 
there are only two levels of attention or ‘degrees of clearness’, focal, conscious 
attention and what is outside it.  For Titchener, the role of attention in perception was 
its most fundamental attribute whereas for other theorists of the time attention’s role 
in action was significant (e.g. Bain, 1888) and for yet others (e.g. Stout, 1891), its role 
in reflective thought.  By the end of the nineteenth century a number of disparate 
claims about the role of attention had been made and it was from this collection of 
ideas that James (1890) put forward his somewhat reductionist approach suggesting 
that “Everyone knows what attention is.  It is the taking possession by the mind in 
clear and vivid form, of one out of what seem several simultaneously possible objects 
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or trains of thought.”  (1890, p.403).  James suggested that the role of attention in 
higher cognitive processes was minimal, and focused more on “the accommodation or 
adjustment of the sensory organs” (1890, p.411), meaning the processes of reacting, 
for example, to a flash of light by turning one’s eyes towards the stimulus.  
In the early twentieth century following the work of Pavlov, Thorndike, 
Watson, Skinner and others the predominant approach to psychology was 
behaviourism.  The behaviourist movement heralded an important change towards 
advances in experimental psychology and the advocacy of empirical testing, but this 
came at the expense of the study of cognitive constructs such as attention.  Attention, 
being an internal process that is difficult to observe, became relegated to 
philosophical discussion. 
In the second half of the twentieth century psychologists were driven by the 
events of the two World Wars to study not only the extremes of human behaviour but 
also cognitive constructs.  Prompted by knowledge of the particular difficulties 
experienced during warfare (for example soldiers having to attend to multiple 
locations on the battlefield, pilots having to attend to several sources of information 
simultaneously in the cockpit and outside the aircraft, radar operators having to 
maintain concentration), cognitive psychologists wanted to learn more about the 
human capacity for attention and its processes.   
Vigilance is a term used to describe a situation in which randomly occurring, 
infrequent signals have to be responded to over a long period of time.  It became a 
topic of interest in the 1940s and ‘50s when after it was noted that detection of enemy 
aircraft by radar operators deteriorated rapidly within just 15 to 30 minutes of starting 
the task (Mackworth, 1950).  Vigilance studies have important implications for 
understanding attention during monotonous and prolonged monitoring tasks and, 
more recently, vigilance research has been applied to issues such as road safety (e.g. 
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Ting et al., 2008), train driving (Haga, 1984) and patient care in hospital intensive 
care units (Balas et al., 2008). 
Another early researcher into attentional processes was Welford (1952), who 
looked at attention to two stimuli presented in rapid succession.  He found that when 
a second stimulus is presented, reaction to the second stimulus was slower if the 
stimulus onset asynchrony (SOA) was very short, and that there was an inverse 
relationship between SOA and reaction time to the second stimulus: for each 
millisecond decrease in SOA there was a corresponding increase in reaction time to 
the second stimulus.  Welford proposed an attentional ‘bottleneck’ model, in which 
processing of the second stimulus cannot begin until processing of the first has been 
completed.  Welford’s theory of attentional processing proved to be the cornerstone 
on which several decades of attention research were later built, and these will be 
discussed in Section 1.2.1. 
According to Allen (1948), the phenomenon of extinction was first described 
by Anton (1883) and by Oppenheim (1885), and further alluded to by Poppelreuter 
during the First World War.  Termed ‘visual inattention’, it concerned the inability of 
patients to detect a visual stimulus on one side if a rival stimulus were simultaneously 
presented on the opposite side.  Bender and Furlow (1945) noted that the size or 
luminosity of the intact stimulus can have an effect on the contralesional stimulus that 
may be neglected, and suggested that the term ‘extinction’ may be more appropriate, 
based upon the premise that a stronger stimulus extinguishes or suppresses a weaker 
one.  Critchley (1966) criticised the use of this new term, nevertheless the expression 
remains widely used today.  The phenomenon of extinction is further described in 
Section 1.3.2. 
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1.2 Theories of attention 
 
1.2.1 Early versus late selection in visual attention 
The question of how and when attentional processes occur has been central to 
a long-standing debate.  On one hand, early selection theory (Treisman, 1969) 
proposed that we have a limited capacity perceptual system and that perception is 
restricted to attended items, hence attention can prevent early processing of irrelevant 
or ignored stimuli.  According to this model, of the many stimuli that surround us at 
any given moment, only one is attended and processed to the level of detection and 
the others are filtered out and fail to reach conscious awareness.  Proponents of late 
selection theory (Deutsch & Deutsch, 1963, Duncan, 1980), on the other hand, 
suggest that the perceptual system is limitless in capacity and that all stimuli are 
perceived and that attention occurs later after all stimuli have been semantically 
processed, affecting post-perceptual processes such as memory or response selection.   
A central question regarding the point at which stimuli are processed (before 
or after selection) is whether the unattended information reaches awareness at any 
level.  One of the earliest theorists to address this question was Cherry (1953), who 
carried out a dichotic listening task in which participants were played two different 
spoken messages simultaneously, one in each ear.  To ensure that attention was 
directed to one of the messages, participants were required to repeat it aloud, a 
process known as shadowing.  Participants were able to report whether the speaker of 
the unattended message had been male or female, however they were unable to report 
the content of the message.  Broadbent (1958) based his ‘filter’ model of attention on 
a similar study, in which participants were presented dichotically with pairs of digits 
and failed to report the unattended digits.  Broadbent concluded that unattended 
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stimuli are not semantically processed and discarded.  Analogous research in the 
visual domain by Neisser (1969) showed that in a selective reading task in which 
participants ignored printed material appearing between the lines of relevant text, they 
were later unable to report the ignored text.  In later studies containing simple images 
rather than more complex semantic material (e.g. Goldstein & Fink, 1981), 
participants were presented with superimposed line drawings and told to attend to one 
of the pair and ignore the other.  In a subsequent recognition test in which both 
images were presented singly, participants recognised significantly more of the 
attended than the unattended stimuli.  A number of studies in the 1970s and ‘80s 
presented dynamic scenes, superimposing two semi-transparent video clips and 
requiring participants to focus on one aspect of the scene whilst ignoring others (e.g. 
Becklen & Cervone, 1983; Littman & Becklen, 1976; Neisser, 1979; Neisser & 
Becklen, 1975; Stoffregen & Becklen, 1989).  During the task, an unexpected event 
occurs that participants do not report having seen, although it is clearly noticeable to 
other observers not engaged in the task.  A renewed interest in this inability to 
perceive an unexpected object, even if it is prominent, has led to the term 
‘inattentional blindness’ (Mack & Rock, 1998).  A more recent and frequently cited 
demonstration of inattentional blindness is a study by Simons and Chabris (1999), in 
which participants are asked to count the number of times a ball is passed between 
three members of a team wearing white t-shirts, and to ignore the three members of a 
second team wearing black t-shirts, who are throwing a second ball between 
themselves (Figure 1.2.1).  During the short course of the ball game, a person dressed 
in a gorilla suit walks across the scene, stops in the centre and beats his chest, and 
continues to walk across the screen.  Participants frequently report having had no 
perception of the gorilla, suggesting that perception is restricted to attended items.   
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Figure 1.2.1: A frame from the video clip used by Simon and Chabris (1999) illustrating inattentional 
blindness.   
 
 Thus far, the studies reviewed have offered support for early selection, but 
there are also an appreciable number of studies supporting the late selection model.  
Even if unattended stimuli fail to reach overt perceptual awareness, there is an 
abundance of evidence that suggests that unattended stimuli are processed to some 
degree.  A number of researchers showed that when meaningful material was 
presented to the non-attended ear in dichotic listening studies, it was processed 
effectively.  In a study by Mackay (1973), for example, participants had to report the 
sentence they had heard.  When the sentence contained the word bank, responses 
were influenced by whether the word river or money had been presented to the non-
attended ear.  Additional evidence comes from the effect of unattended stimuli on 
reaction times, for example in the classic Stroop paradigm (Stroop, 1935), in which 
participants read colour stimulus words printed in different coloured inks.  When the 
word and the colour are congruent (e.g. the word ‘blue’ printed in blue ink), response 
times are faster than when they are incongruent (e.g. the word ‘pink’ printed in green 
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ink).  Despite being told only to report one attribute of the stimulus, the fact that 
responses are slower to incongruent words suggests that the unattended attribute is 
still processed to some extent.  Further support for the notion that stimuli that are 
unattended are processed to some extent comes from implicit processing in visual 
neglect patients.  Patients with visual neglect tend to ignore stimuli on the 
contralesional side of space, but there is compelling evidence to suggest that these 
stimuli are processed to some extent, though not reaching conscious awareness.  A 
detailed discussion of these studies may be found in Section 1.3.1 of this thesis. 
As can be seen, there is much evidence to support both early and late selection 
theories of attention.  Lavie (1995) proposed a hybrid model of attention that 
encompasses key aspects of both theories and, to some extent, offered a resolution to 
the ongoing debate.  Lavie’s (1995) load theory states that there is a limit to the 
capacity of the perceptual system, as proposed by early selection theory, but also that 
all stimuli are processed until perceptual capacity is exhausted.  According to this 
theory, the level of perceptual load determines the extent to which stimuli are 
processed.  In instances of high perceptual load, early selection will occur and when 
perceptual load is low and capacity is not exhausted late selection will occur enabling 
distractor interference. 
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1.2.2.   Focused and selective visual attention 
In the complex environment that surrounds us, it is the visual system that 
provides us with more detailed information than any other sensory system (Milner & 
Goodale, 1995).  Visuospatial attention is crucial to our interaction with the people 
and objects around us and to our perception of depth, movement, space and colour.  
In order to make sense of the myriad of visual sensory stimuli with which we are 
presented at any waking moment, the brain must process not only the visual qualities 
of people and objects, but also their position in relation to us and to one another, their 
size, depth and perspective. 
Posner (1980) found that when participants’ attention is fixated on a particular 
item in the visual field, they can still attend to additional stimuli placed at around 7 
degrees either side of fixation.  Furthermore, attention can be shifted more rapidly 
when a stimulus appears in an expected, rather than an unexpected, location and 
attention can be directed covertly, that is without movement of the eyes.  Posner made 
an analogy between attention and an internal mental spotlight surrounding a region of 
space.  LaBerge (1983)  reported that the speed of identifying a stimulus was a 
function of the distance from the centre of the attentional spotlight.  In a task 
requiring central fixation, reaction times were faster for items appearing at the centre 
of an array of stimuli than for those at the periphery, suggesting that visual attention 
is most efficient at the centre of the internal spotlight and least at its peripheral edges.   
An influential model proposed by Treisman and Gelade (1980) is the feature-
integration theory, which proposes that visual arrays are encoded serially, initially in 
terms of separable dimensions (colour, size, orientation, brightness, direction of 
movement).  It is only at a later stage, when such features are the subject of focused 
attention, that they are combined to form a unitary representation of an object or 
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scene.  Accordingly, the model proposes that without focused attention dimensions 
cannot be related to one another to form a unitary whole.  This notion raises the 
paradox of the way in which unattended surrounding areas are processed not as empty 
space but as vague perceptions.  The authors suggest that the top-down processing of 
unattended features allows access to past experience and contextual information.  
Without focused attention conjunctions of these unattended features can be formed on 
a random basis and give rise to a lack of accuracy in perception.   
Cave a Wolfe (1990) observed that the serial processing model proposed by 
feature-integration theory failed to account for data showing that conjunction searches 
can be performed efficiently and quickly by some participants (Wolfe, Cave and 
Franzel, 1989).  They proposed a guided search theory, which modified feature-
integration theory to account for these observations.  Guided search theory postulates 
that, under some circumstances, visual search can be a parallel rather than a serial 
process; guided search assigns saliency to items in the visual field, such that items 
with nontarget features are inhibited and items with target features are excited.  In 
such instances the parallel stage guides the serial stage as it selects the target features 
that are to be processed.  
Desimone and Duncan (1995) differentiate between top-down and bottom-
up biases for object selection.  Top-down biases on visual attention are contingent on 
prior knowledge of the task at hand and include selection based on spatial location 
and on features.  Bottom-up neural mechanisms appear to be largely automatic 
processes that do not depend on cognition or task demands.  A number of studies 
have further explored this apparent interaction between top-down and bottom-up 
processing in extinction patients (e.g. Gilchrist, Humphreys & Riddoch, 1996;  
Mattingley, Davis & Driver, 1997; Ptak, Valenza & Schnider , 2002; Riddoch, 
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Humphreys, Edwards, Baker & Willson, 2003; Riddoch, Humphreys, Hickman, Clift, 
Daly & Colin, 2006; Soto & Humphreys, 2006; Geng & Behrmann, 2006).   
Recent studies have also demonstrated that attention can be a supramodal 
resource, that is, it can involve more than one modality. Spence et al. (2000) observed 
that a visual cue (such as an arrow) can improve detection of tactile stimuli presented 
in the visually cued position. In  line with this finding, neuroimaging studies have 
demonstrated that similar anatomical areas (i.e., superior parietal lobe, intraparietal 
sulcus and superior temporal gyrus) are activated during attentional tasks involving 
either visual or tactile stimuli (Macaluso, Frith & Driver, 2002; see also Eimer and 
van Velzen, 2002 for similar results using ERP). These findings suggest that attention 
resources for different modalities may be coupled. However, Chambers, Stokes and 
Mattingley (2004) observed that inferior parietal areas may be differently involved in 
covert attention of visual and somatosensory stimuli. In particular, they observed that 
TMS of the right supramarginal gyrus disrupted orientation of visual attention, but 
not somatosensory, suggesting some modality-specific activity of this brain areas. 
Moreover, while this part of the inferior parietal lobule may be involved in covert 
attention, the right angular gyrus seems to be involved in disengaging attention 
following an invalid cue and later processes in discrimination of the target 
(Chambers, Payne, Stokes & Mattingley, 2004). 
Theories of visual attention can be guided and informed by the study of brain 
damaged patients who show specific impairments in attending to visual stimuli, in 
particular spatial neglect and visual extinction.  These impairments are discussed in 
Section 1.3. 
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1.3 Disorders of spatial attention 
One can learn much about the processes of spatial attention in healthy 
individuals by studying ways in which they break down after brain damage.  The 
study of spatially specific neurological disorders falls broadly into two categories.  
The first concerns hemispatial or unilateral neglect, an impairment in the processing 
of one half of perceptual space.  The second, and the main focus of this thesis, 
concerns visual extinction, in which patients are able to perceive a single stimulus in 
either visual field; however, when presented with stimuli simultaneously in both left 
and right visual fields, they ignore or ‘extinguish’ the stimulus on the contralesional 
side of visual space.   
 
1.3.1 Visuospatial neglect 
Visuospatial neglect is a common and debilitating syndrome that follows stroke 
damage to the right hemisphere.  Attention is inexorably shifted towards the 
ipsilesional (usually right) side of space and the analogy of a magnet has been used to 
describe the attentional pull towards ipsilesional space (Halligan & Marshall, 1993; 
Halligan, Fink, Marshall, & Vallar, 2003; Danckert & Ferber, 2006).  Patients will 
neglect items that appear in contralesional space; they may leave food uneaten on the 
left side of a plate, fail to notice someone approaching from their left side or fail to 
groom the left side of the body (personal neglect).  When asked to copy a simple 
picture they will ignore the left hand side of the image (Figure 1.3.1), indeed if given 
a blank circle and asked to fill in numbers to draw a clock, they may crowd all twelve 
numbers into the right hand space of the circle (Figure 1.3.2). 
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Figure 1.3.1: Performance on a copying task by a patient showing evidence of object-centred neglect. 
From Logie and Della Sala, 2005. 
 
 
Figure 1.3.2: A representational task showing a drawing by a patient of a clock in which the left side 
has been omitted, transposing all details to the right side. From Beschin, Basso and Della Sala, 2000. 
 
Various studies have reported how neglect patients may still be able to move their 
eyes or perform movements with their limbs towards the contralesional space. 
Despite this, they may be unable to consciously report information presented in 
contralesional space (Bisiach & Rusconi, 1990; Ferber, Danckert, Joanisse, Goltz, & 
Goodale, 2003). 
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Neglect usually arises following right hemisphere damage, but it can be observed 
following damage to the left hemisphere, in which case the deficit is reported to be 
less severe and less persistent (Beis et al., 2004; but see also Rorden & Karnath, 2012 
for contrasting findings). 
Neglect patients often have a striking lack of awareness of their deficits on the 
affected side, known as anosognosia (Heilman, Barrett & Adair, 1998; Vallar, Bottini 
& Sterzi, 2003).    
Of the many tests used to assess spatial neglect, line bisection is the most 
commonly used (Jewell & McCourt, 2000).  When asked to estimate the midpoint of 
a horizontal line, neglect patients consistently misjudge the central point towards the 
right hand side of the veridical centre (e.g. Heilman, Watson & Valenstein, 1985; 
Mesulam, 2000; Robertson & Halligan, 1999; Schenkenberg, Bradford & Ajax, 
1980), as if ignoring the majority of the line if left hemispace.  Neglect is clinically 
assessed by a number of additional tests including the Bells Test (Gauthier, Dehaut, 
& Joanette, 1989) which consists of seven columns each containing five targets 
(bells) amid 40 distracters and the patient is asked to draw a line through all the bells 
on the page (Figure.1.3.3) and line cancellation tasks, in which the task is to draw a 
line through (or cancel out) a series of short lines drawn at varying angles.  In these 
tests, a patient showing neglect will cancel the stimuli on the right hand side of the 
page and neglect those on the left.  Ferber and Karnath (2001) undertook a 
comparison of neglect assessment tests and reported that line bisection should be 
treated with caution in clinical diagnosis since 40% of their patients performed well 
in bisecting horizontal lines despite impairment on other tasks.  Line cancellation was 
found to be less sensitive than tests with distracters, such as the Bells test.  The 
sensitivity of a test is increased when the stimuli have a high density and are 
interspersed with distracters.  Bickerton, Samson, Williamson and Humphreys (2011) 
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have recently assessed evidence of different forms of neglect on a large sample of 115 
acute stoke patients by means of the Apples Test (Figure 1.3.4), which seems to be a 
useful diagnostic tool to differentiate allocentric (i.e. tendency to neglect one side of 
an object) and egocentric neglect (i.e. the tendency to neglect all stimuli in one side of 
the patient’s body). 
 
 
 
Figure 1.3.3: Apples Test cancellation sheet, in which some apples have an opening on the left, some 
on the right and some are complete apples. Participants have to cancel all complete apples, ignoring 
all the others. 
  
Personal neglect is another form of neglect often assessed by means of tests 
such as the Comb and Razor/Compact Test (Beschin & Robertson, 1997), in which 
the patient is asked to demonstrate the use of a comb and a razor or make-up compact 
and the Fluff Test (Cocchini, Beschin, & Jehkonen, 2001), in which small cardboard 
circles are attached with velcro to the patient’s clothing at predefined locations on the 
body, and the patient is required to remove all the targets attached to their clothes 
whilst blindfolded. 
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 Neglect can occur not only in the visual modality, but also in tactile, auditory, 
proprioceptive and olfactory domains (Heilman, Watson & Valenstein, 1993; 
Mesulam, 1981; Pavini, Làdavas & Driver, 2003; Vallar, Guaraglia, Nico & Bisiach, 
1995; Brozzoli & Farne, 2012). Interestingly, recent studies have investigated the 
multi-modal effects of some rehabilitation techniques. Kerkhoff et al. (2012) 
demonstrated that techniques such as optokinetic stimulation can ameliorate both 
auditory and visual neglect. Neglect affects not only the external sensory world, but 
also visual imagery: Bisiach and Luzzatti (1978) asked patients to imagine they were 
standing with their back to the cathedral in Milan’s Piazza del Duomo, a busy 
meeting place well known to residents of Milan, and to describe the imaginary scene. 
Patients described the historic buildings, shops and restaurants on the right hand side 
of the scene, but omitted details from the left.  When asked to imagine that they had 
walked across the square and were now facing the cathedral, they then described the 
buildings on the opposite side of the square, again omitting the details on their left 
hand side. The concept of representation neglect has been further replicated 
(Bartolomeo, D’Erme & Gainotti, 1994) and investigated by means of different tasks 
involving number line (e.g., Zorzi, Priftis, Meneghello, Marenzi & Unilta, 2006; 
Vuilleumier, Ortigue, & Brugger, 2004) and word (Arduino et al. 2012) 
representations. 
 A number of studies have shown that, despite profound neglect of 
contralesional space, there can be an implicit awareness of items in the contralesional 
visual field. Marshall and Halligan (1988) presented their patient with two line 
drawings of a house which were identical, apart from smoke and flames appearing in 
the left hand window.  The patient stated that the two drawings were identical 
however, when asked which one she would prefer to live in, she consistently chose 
the house that was not on fire (Figure 1.3.5). 
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Figure 1.3.4: The ‘Burning House’ study, adapted from Marshall and Halligan (1988) 
 
 This study was carried out with only one patient.  It has since been replicated 
using different images such as two wine glasses, one with a chip on the left hand rim 
and two bank notes, one with the top left hand corner torn away (Bisiach & Rusconi, 
1990), however with equivocal results.  Of Bisiach and Rusconi’s four patients, two 
showed no consistent preferences for any of the images but two did show preferences 
(although not always for the more rationally appealing of the two images), suggesting 
that they did notice some difference between the pairs of pictures and were able to 
make choices on the basis of this difference without any conscious justification of 
their selections. 
 Whilst neglect is often more severe in the acute stage of brain damage, in the 
first weeks immediately following a stroke, recovery is possible – the majority of 
patients show spontaneous recovery within days or weeks (Manly, 2001).  Recovery 
is aided by occupational therapy, in which the patient is encouraged to move his or 
her eyes towards the left and to actively search for stimuli in left hemispace, as well 
as by plasticity, the brain’s unique capacity for undamaged neural structures to take 
over the functions that the damaged structures can no longer perform.  While the 
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deficits in spatial awareness from neglect may, in time, become ameliorated (Hier, 
Mondlock, & Caplan, 1983), patients often still display visual extinction. 
 
  
 
1.3.2 Visual Extinction 
Visual extinction refers to an impairment in detecting a contralesional 
stimulus when presented simultaneously with an ipsilesional stimulus, whilst able to 
detect a single stimulus presented alone in either visual field (Bender & Teuber, 1946; 
Critchley, 1966; Wortis, Bender, & Teuber, 1948).  Extinction is thought to arise 
from a competition between the ipsilesional and contralesional stimuli, leading the 
ipsilesional stimulus to extinguish the contralesional one from awareness (Driver, 
2001; Driver & Vuilleumier, 2001; Mattingley, Davis, & Driver, 1997). When both 
stimuli must compete for attention simultaneously the intact (left) hemisphere 
processing the ipsilesional stimulus is thought to divert attention from the damaged 
(right) hemisphere’s processing of the contralesional stimulus, resulting in extinction 
of the contralesional stimulus.   
Extinction is clinically assessed by the Visual Confrontation Test, in which 
the tester stands centrally in front of the patient with both hands raised.  The patient is 
instructed to fixate on the tester’s nose, and to detect movements in the fingers of the 
tester’s left or right hand, or both hands simultaneously.   One would expect a patient 
with visual extinction to detect movements in either hand when made unilaterally, but 
in bilateral stimulation to detect only the movement in the tester’s left hand (i.e. the 
patient’s right visual field).  Stimuli are well above threshold (Mattingley, 2002) so 
performance for single contralesional events is often at ceiling.  Computerised tests 
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can be used in the assessment and investigation of extinction, in which stimuli are 
briefly displayed unilaterally and bilaterally in both visual fields.  Such tests allow 
more precise control of stimuli, including their duration, salience, size and location. 
 Whilst a number of theories have been proposed to account for this deficit, a 
definitive explanation remains yet to be accepted. Early researchers (e.g. Bender & 
Teuber, 1946; Denny-Brown, Meyer & Horenstein, 1952;  Birch, Belmont & Karp, 
1967) and more recent studies (e.g. Farah, Monheit & Wallace, 1991; Vallar, 
Rusconi, Bignamini, Geminiani & Perani, 1994; Marzi et al., 1996) posited a ‘sensory 
hypothesis’, suggesting that extinction is a result of weakened afferent input to the 
damaged hemisphere.  In contrast, the ‘attentional hypothesis’ (Bisiach, 1991; 
Heilman & Watson, 1977; Mesulam, 1981; Rafal, 1994)  accounts for extinction as a 
biased competition for attentional selection, in which a stimulus presented in 
ipsilesional space is favoured over one in contralesional space in double simultaneous 
stimulation.  There is evidence to support the notion that extinction is an attentional 
deficit rather than a sensory one.  For example, patients fail to detect a single 
contralesional target (even in the absence of an ipsilesional one) if their attention is 
cued towards the ipsilesional field (Posner, Walker, Friedrich, & Rafal, 1984).  
Similarly, if instructed to ignore an ipsilesional target and attend to the contralesional 
one the target can be detected (Di Pellegrino & De Renzi, 1995; Karnath, 1988).  
Moreover, if two stimuli are presented to the ipsilesional hemifield, patients often 
extinguish the leftward of the two stimuli (Kinsbourne, 1987; Di Pellegrino & De 
Renzi, 1995). 
 One factor that has been shown to modulate extinction is the perceptual 
grouping of visual stimuli.  Ward, Goodrich and Driver (1994) investigated the 
effects of perceptual grouping on two patients with extinction following right parietal 
damage. Experiment 1 investigated the effect of grouping on the number of extinction 
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errors by presenting bilateral displays of either grouped (two aligned square brackets) 
or ungrouped (a bracket and a dot) bilateral stimuli, as well as unilateral and blank 
displays.  The task was to indicate verbally whether stimuli had been seen on the left, 
the right, both sides, or neither.  For both participants, left bracket detections were 
significantly greater in the grouped than in the ungrouped double displays, lending 
support to the idea that grouping modulates extinction.  In order to address the 
question of whether reduced extinction occurred as a result of the similarity and/or 
symmetry of the items displayed in Experiment 1, Experiment 2 consisted of stimuli 
that formed a familiar configuration (an arrow) when grouped, whilst controlling for 
similarity and symmetry.  The stimuli were a horizontal line and a ‘V’ shape, 
presented singly or in combination.  In the grouped trials, the ‘V’ was presented 
rotated 90˚ so that, when displayed to the right or left of a horizontal line, the two 
stimuli formed the familiar shape of an arrow (Figure 1.3.6). 
 
 
                              
Figure 1.3.5: Ungrouped and grouped stimuli from Ward, Goodrich and Driver (1994). 
When ungrouped, the stimuli represent a horizontal line and a ‘V’ shape; when grouped, they form the 
shape of an arrow. 
 
For both patients, extinction in the grouped ‘arrow’ displays occurred less 
often than in the ungrouped displays.  Ward et al. explained their results in terms of 
weight linkage; when a contralesional item and an ipsilesional item are grouped they 
are assigned a common selection weight, thus eliminating the competition for 
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selection between the two items whereby the contralesional item becomes 
extinguished.   
Gilchrist, Humphreys and Riddoch (1996) further explored the role of low-
level grouping processes in modulating visual extinction by minimizing the reliance 
on stored memory templates.  They investigated the modulating effect of edge- 
brightness-based grouping, achieved by presenting pairs of light and dark circles and 
squares.  Grouping was manipulated in terms of collinear edges and brightness (e.g. 
when two squares of the same polarity were presented, grouping was deemed to be 
present in both collinear edges and brightness; in contrast when two circles of 
opposite polarity were presented, there was neither collinearity nor the same 
brightness to support grouping).  Each of the features was found to have a strong 
modulating effect on extinction and the effect was greater when both features were 
present together.  Gilchrist et al. argue that grouping on the basis of low-level 
processes based on the elementary relationships of collinearity and brightness can 
modulate extinction without recourse to stored representations of known objects.  A 
further experiment (Experiment 3) found that these low-level grouping processes 
have similar effects when both items are presented in the same hemifield, rather than 
across the midline.  Experiment 4 assessed the effect on grouping of the proximity of 
items.  This was achieved by presenting items that were grouped on both collinearity 
and brightness (light coloured squares), but manipulating the distance between the 
two items on the screen.  Extinction was reduced on trials in which the items were 
closely spaced together but performance decreased as the separation increased.  These 
data support the notion of a bottom-up process in modulating extinction. 
Mattingley, Davis and Driver (1997) noted that a prediction arising from the 
attentional hypothesis of extinction is that, if extinction arises when two events 
compete for attention, then preattentive visual processes should occur normally on the 
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contralesional side, with a bias towards the ipsilesional side arising only at a later 
stage.  They tested this prediction using a paradigm of illusory figures that induce 
visual filling-in in normal healthy participants.  The first of these was a Kanizsa 
figure in which edges and brightness are illusorily perceived, and in a subsequent 
experiment a 3-D representation of a cube that occluded a bar in some trials (see 
Figure 1.3.7).  In all conditions their participant responded with greater accuracy 
when bilateral events were grouped together.  These data extended the previous 
findings (which had all been based on grouping by 2D alignment) to show that 
extinction can operate at the level of interpretation of depth in perceptually filled-in 
surfaces.   
 
            
 
Figure 1.3.6: Kanizsa figure and 3-D image of a bar occluded by a cube.   
Figures taken and adapted from Mattingley, Davis and Driver (1997). 
 
 
Extending the research on the effects of perceptual grouping on object 
selection, Riddoch, Humphreys, Edwards, Baker and Willson (2003) found that 
action relations between objects can also influence selection.  Stimuli consisted of 
drawings of pairs of everyday objects (for example a wine bottle and corkscrew) 
placed in the correct positions for use, and in incongruent positions.  Either a single 
item was presented to the left or right of fixation, or a pair of pictures was presented 
with one to either side of fixation.  The experiment clearly showed that extinction 
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between separate objects can be reduced if the objects are grouped in terms of being 
placed in the correct relative positions for action.  Similar findings emerged from a 
second experiment which controlled for objects that are associatively related, for 
example a witch and a cauldron; on trials in which the pictures were related merely as 
associative pairs rather than pairs positioned for action, extinction was found to be 
greater.  A third experiment found no equivalent mediation of extinction when action-
related words were presented, suggesting that the effect was not at an associative 
semantic level.  The study shows that grouping between visual stimuli is crucial in 
selective attention, not only when they are grouped on the basis of Gestalt factors, but 
also when they are grouped by familiarity of actions.  Interestingly, the intrinsic 
knowledge of actions between objects seems to be of greater influence than simply 
the association between the two objects. 
A later study by Riddoch, Humphreys, Hickman, Clift, Daly and Colin (2006) 
investigated the effect of action familiarity on recovery from extinction in greater 
depth, with particular emphasis on (a) whether the effect changed when the objects 
displayed were frequently used together in actions, rather than objects that simply 
could be used together, (b) the location of the objects and (c) whether the effect was 
different if the objects were coloured images rather than line drawings.   In support of 
Riddoch et al.’s 2003 study, patients were more likely to select both items on bilateral 
trials where there was an action relation between the objects than when there was not.  
Moreover, the effect is influenced by the frequency of joint usage, for example a 
bottle positioned for pouring into a wine glass was more likely to be perceived than a 
bottle positioned for pouring into a bucket.  When the objects were plausibly 
positioned for action (a bottle positioned for pouring into a wine glass) they were 
more likely to be selected than when they were paired but not positioned for action (a 
bottle standing next to a wine glass).  Hence, the advantage for selection was due not 
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only to the fact that the objects formed a familiar pair, but also to the fact that they 
appeared as they would in action.  The authors propose a two-stage model of attention 
in which attention is initially focused on either a single object or on a pair of objects.  
This first stage is influenced by whether the objects can be used together and are 
positioned for action.  This is followed by a second stage in which the objects are 
selected serially for report, driven by the familiarity of the action and the frequency of 
each object.   
Ptak, Valenza and Schnider (2002) sought to investigate whether it is only 
perceptual factors that can modulate extinction, or whether strategic factors and 
expectation biases also play a role in facilitating access to perceptual information.  
The first of their three experiments was designed as a baseline measure to determine 
the rate of extinction in their patient.  Stimuli were green or red squares or diamonds 
and a characteristic pattern of extinction was found in bilateral trials, regardless of 
whether the stimuli were grouped by colour or shape.  Experiment 2 investigated 
whether a grouping effect would emerge when the processing of features was 
enhanced by top-down cues; the participant was asked to report features of 
contralesional stimuli rather than simply on the presence or absence of the stimuli.  
The participant was explicitly informed that there would be stimuli on both sides in 
every trial and was asked to try to identify the colour and/or shape of one of the 
features in each trial, even if he was unaware of having consciously seen it.  Unlike 
the findings of Experiment 1, performance was significantly enhanced when the two 
stimuli were grouped on the basis of similarity of colour or shape when either one or 
both features had to be reported.  Experiment 3 assessed the effect of expectation 
bias; this was achieved by alerting the participant to which feature (colour or form) he 
would be asked to report on each trial, prior to presentation of stimuli.  These cues 
were either coherent (e.g. the word ‘colour’ was presented and he was asked to report 
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the colour), or incoherent (e.g. the word ‘colour’ was presented and he was asked to 
report the shape).  The participant was informed that the coherent cues would appear 
more often than the incoherent cues and he could enhance his performance by 
attending to the feature indicated by the cue.  As well as determining whether there 
was a ‘validity effect’ (dependent upon whether cues were coherent or incoherent), 
this experiment also allowed a comparison between the top-down effect of cueing 
validity and the bottom-up effect of grouping by similarity.  A significant effect of 
validity was found for both features (colour and shape) whilst there was no effect of 
grouping, suggesting that grouping by similarity alone is not sufficient to modulate 
extinction whereas top-down cueing enhances processing of relevant features. 
In a priming paradigm similar to that of Ptak at al. (2002), Soto and 
Humphreys (2006) emphasized the function of working memory in expectation bias, 
and suggested that extinction may be modulated through priming, based on the 
assumption that a primed display will remain in stored knowledge and will influence 
selection.  In contrast to Ward et al.’s (1994) paradigm, which demonstrated that 
grouped double displays which formed a familiar configuration (an arrow) modulated 
extinction, Soto and Humphreys (2006) invoked stored knowledge by a cueing 
process, and proposed that it is the match between the contents of the primed working 
memory and the stimuli presented in the visual field that enhances awareness.  Their 
five patients were presented with a variety of shapes (square, circle, triangle or 
diamond), each in one of three colours (red, blue or yellow) and were asked to report 
the colour and shape of the target objects.  A cue was displayed for 1 second at the 
start of each trial, and participants were asked to retain the cue in memory.  Either one 
or two target objects were then displayed in the left or right visual field, with one 
object matching the memory cue on just over half of the trials.  In the bilateral trials, 
when the memory cue did not match the target there was clear extinction but there 
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was a reduction in extinction when the cued shape matched one of the target shapes, 
most notably when it matched the target on the contralesional side.  In order to 
address the question of whether this effect was simply due to visual similarity of the 
properties of the cue and the target, the experiment was re-run with two participants, 
using verbal memory cues (e.g. ‘green square’) rather than visual cues.  Weaker 
effects of modulation of extinction were found and these were not specific to 
contralesional items, so it was concluded that the semantic properties of the item held 
in memory need to be complemented by a visual memory representation in order for 
the effect to be strong enough to modulate extinction.  Interestingly, a second 
experiment showed that presentation of the visual cued memory items without 
instruction to retain them in memory did not modulate extinction, suggesting that 
bottom-up cueing is not sufficient to overcome competition for selection.  To confirm 
that the primes were being retained in memory and not simply processed to the level 
of identification, a third experiment required participants to verbalise the features of 
the memory cue before the target was displayed.  Contralesional items were 
extinguished under this condition, showing that priming effects did not take place 
when primes were processed to the level of identification but not committed to 
memory.  A final experiment was carried out presenting the cued items for 3 seconds 
(the time taken to verbalise the prime in the previous experiment) rather than 1 
second.  This produced a strong extinction effect, as in Experiment 1.  These data 
show that extinction is modulated when a contralesional stimulus is matched by the 
contents of working memory, but there is no effect when the cue is not committed to 
memory, even when its properties are verbalized. 
A recent study by Geng and Behrmann (2006) demonstrated the dynamic 
nature of both bottom-up and top-down attentional processes in determining 
perceptual outcomes. In a controlled, repeated measures study, attention was directed 
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to the expected stimuli in a top-down manner by manipulating the probability of the 
target’s location, reducing the effects of bias towards the ipsilesional side.  This was 
achieved by presenting the target in Position 2 of 6 possible positions on 50% of 
trials, so that there was a probability bias in terms of the target location.  Conversely, 
a second experiment included a distractor on the opposite side of space, thus 
introducing a bottom-up factor that should increase neglect of contralesional stimuli.  
A crucial question was whether the reduction in contralesional extinction induced by 
location probability would reduce interference from the ipsilesional distractor.  The 
results suggested that this was indeed the case; the cost in terms of neglect of 
contralesional stimuli when a distractor was present was less when facilitation was 
afforded by location probability.  The authors describe this dynamic process as a 
‘push-pull’ relationship between bottom-up and top-down attentional factors. 
Testing extinction patients has its drawbacks.  For example, Mattingley et al. 
(1997) report that the performance of one of their participants improved significantly 
in the interval between testing sessions due to rapid recovery from extinction.  There 
are additional difficulties in drawing inferences about the premorbid function of 
lesion patients.  Moreover, since lesions can produce deficits to adjoining cortical 
areas, there can be difficulties in sourcing patients who exhibit extinction in isolation 
without additional neurological complications.   
 The study of extinction patients has nonetheless contributed enormously to 
our understanding of early visual attention.  The debate as to whether extinction is a 
sensory or an attentional deficit remains, however there is clear evidence to advocate 
the legitimacy of an attentional explanation.  Extinction is modulated by a number of 
bottom-up and top-down factors; indeed it has been shown that there is a dynamic 
interaction between these two types of attentional processes in their combined effect 
on extinction. 
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The notion of attentional competition between stimuli is not confined to brain 
damaged patients, but has parallels with studies showing that neurologically healthy 
individuals can have difficulties in attending to simultaneous stimuli.  Puleo and 
Pastore (1978) reported that, in a test of auditory attention, healthy volunteers were 
able to report single targets presented to each ear, but not two targets presented 
simultaneously.  Using a visual discrimination task, Duncan (1980) reported that 
participants were able to indicate whether a target was present in a display as long as 
there was only a single target present.  When two targets appeared simultaneously, 
performance declined significantly.  These studies suggest that healthy individuals 
have an attentional limitation that is manifested when two or more targets require 
simultaneous processing, akin to visual extinction after unilateral damage.  The 
difference, of course, is that brain damaged patients show a spatial bias not present in 
healthy individuals, with impairment for targets in contralesional space. 
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1.4 Neural correlates of spatial attention 
 
1.4.1 Disentangling neglect and extinction 
Neglect and extinction are closely linked and commonly co-occur in patients 
with right brain damage.  Phenomenally, they are similar to one another in that both 
reflect an attentional pull towards the right side of space and away from the left, 
resulting in leftmost stimuli being ignored or unprocessed
1
.  However, the two 
deficits are operationally distinguishable: neglect reflects a failure to spontaneously 
explore the contralesional side of space, whilst extinction requires the presence of a 
competing ipsilesional stimulus presented simultaneously.  One could make the 
distinction that neglect reflects a deficit in exploration of contralesional space, 
whereas extinction affects detection of distinct stimuli or changes in the environment.   
Neglect patients are drawn to the ipsilesional side of space and this tends to be 
reflected in their general posture (more readily turning the head towards the right) as 
well as their attentional inclination.  When assessed with typical tasks such as 
cancellation or copying, the patient is free to move his or her head and eyes.  Tasks 
assessing extinction, on the other hand, always require central fixation. 
Whilst some early authors saw extinction as one of the clinical manifestations 
of neglect (Heilman & Valenstein, 1972), or even as a mild form of neglect (Denny-
Brown & Banker, 1954; Heilman & Watson, 1977), numerous instances of extinction 
without neglect and of neglect without extinction have been reported (e.g. Hier, 
Mondlock & Caplan, 1983; Ogden, 1985; Vallar et al., 1994; Stone, Halligan, 
Marshall & Greenwood, 1998; Cocchini, Cubelli, Della Sala & Beschin, 1999; 
Vossel, Eschenbeck, Weiss, Weidner, Saliger, Karbe, & Fink, 2011).  Such a double 
                                                 
1
 Neglect is most commonly reported after right hemisphere damage.  However, patients with right-
sided visual neglect after left hemisphere damage have been reported (e.g. (Beis et al., 2004; Vallar & 
Peroni, 1986; Vallar, Rusconi, Gemiani, Berti, & Cappa, 1991)  
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dissociation is often taken to indicate separate underlying anatomical processes 
(Shallice, 1988), but a number of authors have exercised caution in accepting this 
assumption in the case of neglect and extinction, for example Driver, Mattingley, 
Rorden & Davis (1997) suggested that apparent lack of extinction in a patient may be 
due simply to insufficiently demanding tasks that lack sensitivity.  However, 
Cocchini et al. (1999) pointed out that the standard tasks used to assess the two 
deficits are qualitatively different: neglect tests (cancellation, drawing, copying) 
involve exploratory motor processes, whereas those used to assess extinction 
generally rely on perceptual-sensory tasks.  The authors suggested that the neglect-
extinction dissociation may be explained by the parallel/serial dichotomy, whereby 
classic extinction tasks would be classed as parallel and neglect tasks as serial.   
 
1.4.2 Anatomical correlates of neglect and extinction 
Traditional accounts of neglect and extinction (e.g. Heilman, Watson & 
Valenstein, 1985) assumed that they are parietal impairments.  More recently, Milner 
and Goodale (1995) suggested that the two disorders are dissociable, reflecting 
damage to different areas of the parietal cortex: damage to the superior parietal lobe 
(SPL) resulting in extinction and to the IPL in neglect.  Mattingley (1999) suggested 
that extinction cannot be attributed to any one cortical or subcortical site, but that it 
can arise from damage to a number of areas of the brain. 
Neglect has been suggested to be associated with lesion of the IPL and 
perisylvian areas, particularly the angular and supramarginal gyri (Brodman areas 39 
and 40), according to Mort et al. (2003). Damage to the right frontal ventral lobe has 
also been implicated in neglect (e.g. Damasio, Damasio & Chui, 1987), consistent 
with the notion that anterior sites such as the frontal lobe might form part of an 
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integrated circuit with more posterior regions.  However neglect is characterised by a 
wide heterogeneity of symptoms and it is possible that different anatomical areas and 
networks play different roles (Verdon et al., 2010). The authors suggested that more 
severe forms of neglect may be due to lesions of white matter causing intra-
hemispheric disconnection. The notion that extinction arises from an attentional 
competition between two stimuli, with the stimulus processed by the intact 
hemisphere winning the competition has already been described in Section 1.3.2. The 
neural basis for the competition between stimuli is addressed by Ungerleider and 
Mishkin (1982) who describe a network of over 30 cortical visual areas organised 
within two major cortical pathways for visual processing, both originating in the 
primary visual cortex, or V1. The first of these, a ventral stream, is directed from the 
primary visual areas to the inferior temporal cortex and is crucially implicated in 
object recognition.  The second, a dorsal stream, is directed to the posterior parietal 
cortex and is important for spatial perception and visual performance.  It is this dorsal 
stream that appears to be disrupted in visual extinction arising from damage to the 
parietal area, though this assumption has been disputed by some authors (e.g. Milner 
& Goodale, 1995, see below).   Ungerleider and Mishkin’s ‘two visual systems’ 
model made a major impact on visual neuroscience (according to Goodale and 
Milner, 2004, it has been cited more times than any other paper in the field of visual 
neuroscience), but has been criticised by some (e.g. Turnbull, 1999) for its simple 
dichotomous concept, which has been thought to underestimate the complexities of 
the human brain.  Milner and Goodale (1995) offered a new interpretation of this ‘two 
visual systems’ model after noting that their patient DF, a visual agnostic patient, was 
unable to process information on a visuo-perceptual task, whilst being remarkably 
accurate in using the same visual information on a visuo-motor task.  Milner and 
Goodale suggested that a more accurate description of the dorsal pathway would be 
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the control of motor behaviour.  They argued that disorders of spatial attention do not 
arise from a disruption of the dorsal visual stream for a number of reasons.  Firstly, 
animal studies have shown that is extremely difficult to mimic neglect in monkeys by 
disrupting the posterior parietal area.  Secondly, the human dorsal stream terminates 
not in the inferior parietal lobe (with which many cases of neglect are associated), but 
in the superior part.  Thirdly, given the findings of Bisiach and Luzzatti (1978, see 
Section 1.3.1 above) that neglect affects mental imagery as well as overt visual 
representation, it is difficult to see how the dorsal stream could be responsible for 
mental imagery and thus lead to neglect when disrupted.  Milner and Goodale (1995) 
tentatively suggested a possible third stream of processing, which leads visuo-spatial 
information from the primary visual cortex to the inferior parietal lobes.  This 
tentative ‘three visual stream’ model is illustrated in Figure 1.4.1. 
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Figure 1.4.1: Diagram illustrating Ungerleider and Mishkin’s (1982) model of two streams of 
processing (indicated by white arrows) and a third stream tentatively proposed by Milner and Goodale 
(1995), in which a third stream transmits information to the inferior parietal lobule.   
Taken from Turnbull (1999). 
 
 
In a neuroimaging study, Karnath, Himmelbach and Küker (2003) aimed to 
clarify whether or not neglect and extinction arise from discrete underlying 
mechanisms.  27 acute stroke patients with unilateral right hemisphere cortical lesions 
were clinically tested for visual, auditory and tactile extinction.  After being 
categorised either as showing extinction plus neglect, pure extinction (no neglect) or 
pure neglect (no extinction), as well as a control group with right hemisphere damage 
but neither extinction nor neglect, their lesions were mapped and superimposed to 
find regions of neural involvement.   
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                    A) Neglect                                                            B) Extinction 
Figure 1.4.2: Surface views of the centres of lesion overlap for patients with A) pure neglect and  
B) Pure extinction.  Figure taken and adapted from Karnath, Himmelbach and Küker (2003) 
 
Patients with pure neglect showed a centre of lesion overlap in the superior 
temporal gyrus, extending into the ventral area of the inferior parietal lobule.  Patients 
with pure extinction, on the other hand, were found to have lesions that overlapped 
more caudally and dorsally at the temporo-parietal junction (TPJ).  The authors claim 
that the TPJ appears to be the neural correlate of visual extinction, and thus the 
crucial area responsible for the detection of distinct stimuli or changes in the 
environment.  This finding does fit with earlier reports that patients with lesions to the 
TPJ area showed extinction (Friedrich, Egly, Rafal, & Beck, 1998) and also with the 
notion that the TPJ is part of the stimulus-driven (bottom-up) attentional system 
(Corbetta & Shulman, 2002).  However, final participant numbers were small (7 with 
pure neglect and 4 with pure extinction) and the point made by Cocchini et al. (1999) 
may well apply also to this study: the tests used to categorise patients with extinction 
relied on perceptual-sensory tasks, whilst those used to categorise neglect patients 
relied on exploratory motor processes.  This being the case, it may be that the 
anatomical differences shown by Karnath et al. (2003) reflect not areas implicated in 
neglect and extinction, but areas responsible for different methods of perceptual 
processing.   
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More recent studies on right brain damaged patients confirm that neglect and 
extinction share different neural substrates but reach slightly different conclusions. 
Indeed, while extinction seems more related to lesions of the right inferior parietal 
lobe, neglect would be more related to damages in fronto-parietal areas (Vossel et al. 
2011). Recent fMRI studies confirm that different pattern of activation may be 
observed during visuo-spatial tasks in acute stroke patients. The authors found that 
while patients showing visual spatial neglect, but not visual extinction, tend to show a 
reduced activation of the right parietal cortex, right occipital cortex and left frontal 
areas, patients showing extinction, but not neglect, show an increased activation of 
the left prefrontal areas (Umarova et al., 2011). 
 
 
In summary, the question of whether neglect and extinction are two discrete, 
dissociable disorders or not remains unresolved, but evidence from neuroimaging 
studies suggests that this may be the case with neglect arising from damage to 
different areas than extinction. 
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1.5 Attentional asymmetry in healthy                 
 individuals 
 
1.5.1 Theories of attentional asymmetry 
Given the diverse specialisations of each of the two cerebral hemispheres and 
the right hemisphere’s involvement with visuospatial attention, it would not be 
surprising to learn if attention were functionally more efficient in the right 
hemisphere than the left in the healthy brain.  An early empirical observation 
(Dallenbach, 1920) noted that the same patch of light appeared more vivid when 
presented to the left than to the right of fixation.  However, subsequent studies found 
an underlying rightward superiority for visual (e.g. Barton, Goodglass & Shai, 1965) 
and auditory (Kimura, 1961, 1966) stimuli based on speed of response.  This right-
sided asymmetry for speed of response applies not only to written and verbal 
material, but also to simple reaction time to light (Kerr, Mingay, & Elithorn, 1963) 
and sound (Simon, 1969).  Davidoff (1975) explored the relationship between 
handedness and the perception of lightness in shades of colour and reported that right-
handers judged stimuli in the left visual field as lighter than that in the right visual 
field (with both grey and red stimuli).  In the light of earlier studies (e.g. Kappauf & 
Yeatman, 1970; Jeeves & Dixon, 1970; Jeeves, 1972) that reported faster responses 
by right-handed individuals to stimuli in the left visual field, these data supported the 
notion that (in right-handers at least) the right hemisphere is more important for 
perceptual functions. In a later study, Davidoff (1976) reported right hemisphere 
advantages in colour perception, both in hue (the degree to which a shade differs from 
a stimulus that can be described as red, green, blue or yellow) and saturation (ratio of 
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coloured to white light), with a greater discriminability for left visual field (right 
hemisphere) presentations.  Davidoff (1977) reported two experiments using healthy 
volunteers which showed a significant advantage for detection of dots in the left 
visual field.  This was found to be more pronounced when stimulus contrast was 
reduced and was more robust in male participants than female.  It was suggested that 
the right hemisphere is more efficient than the left in dealing with simple perceptual 
stimuli.  A number of studies (e.g. Cohen, 1975) have found that in healthy right-
handed adults verbal stimuli elicit faster response times when presented to the right 
than the left sensory channel (ear, visual hemifield, hand).  Traditionally, these 
findings have been ascribed to an anatomical pathway-transmission model, which 
states that stimuli are more readily processed when they have direct access to the 
hemisphere that is more specialised in processing them.  Thus, verbal and language-
based stimuli are more readily processed by the left hemisphere and non-verbal 
stimuli by the right hemisphere. 
However, researchers challenged this assumption on a number of levels.  
Firstly, studies have suggested that attentional factors play a part in the extent to 
which these asymmetries are seen (Kinsbourne, 1974; Klein, Moscovitch & Vigno, 
1976).  Secondly, it was suggested by Goldstein and Lackner (1974) that spatial 
variations have an effect on the asymmetry of verbal stimuli in a dichotic listening 
task.  Thirdly, as Heilman at al. (1987) point out, there is a paradigmatic confound in 
traditional laterality tasks, namely that in (for example) visual half-field studies, 
stimuli are presented to one hemifield; however hemispace is not the same as the 
visual half-field, but refers to the corporeal and extracorporeal half-space to the left 
and right of body midline.  Because of this confound between sensory channel and 
hemispace, laterality effects could be attributed either to the anatomical relationship 
between each hemisphere and the contralateral input/sensory output apparatus, or to 
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the ability of each hemisphere to attend to stimuli in the contralateral spatial field.  
This third observation was supported in a study by Bowers and Heilman (1980) in 
which healthy participants were blindfolded and presented with a wooden stick, in 
which they were asked to point out the midline.  Bisection performance was 
significantly more accurate when performed in the left hemispace than at midline or 
in right hemispace and there was a significant interaction between hand and 
hemispace with best performance made by left hand in left hemispace and worst 
performance made by right hand in right hemispace.  These findings suggested that 
the laterality effects found stemmed from a combination of some attentional 
mechanism involved in the contralateral spatial field and the anatomical connections 
between the specialised hemisphere and the contralateral hand. 
To account for the attentional bias seen in right hemisphere-damaged patients 
with neglect and extinction, Kinsbourne (1970) postulated that both hemispheres 
direct attention towards contralateral space, and that when one hemisphere is injured, 
attentional processes in the other become excessively active, resulting in an ipsilateral 
bias.  Heilman and Watson (1977) concurred with Kinsbourne to the extent that each 
hemisphere directs attention towards contralateral space and that there is an 
ipsilesional bias following damage to one hemisphere.  However they suggested that 
this bias is due to underaction in the damaged hemisphere, rather than attentional 
overaction in the undamaged hemisphere.  There followed a hypoactive vs. 
hyperactive hemisphere attentional bias debate.  However, the two views are not 
mutually contradictory and it seems reasonable to conclude that both contribute to our 
understanding of disorders of spatial attention. 
According to Heilman and Van Den Abell (1980), healthy individuals are 
more likely to be unaware of targets in right than left hemispace (in line cancellation 
tasks), suggesting that a normal participant’s attention is slightly biased towards the 
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left part of space; stimuli that fall in the left visual field (and hence are directed to the 
right hemisphere) are attended to more than those that fall in the right visual field.  
Heilman and Van Den Abell suggested that the right hemisphere directs attention to 
both visual fields whilst the left hemisphere directs attention only to the right visual 
field.  Thus, when the attentional mechanisms of the right hemisphere are damaged 
(as in spatial neglect), the result is an inability to attend to stimuli in the left visual 
field.  Mesulam (1981) concurred with this view that the right hemisphere has 
attentional functions that span both hemispaces, whereas the left hemisphere seems to 
be mainly responsible for attention in right hemispace.  He suggested that the right 
hemisphere of dextrals has a functional specialisation for distribution of directed 
attention in extrapersonal space.  On the other hand Kinsbourne (1974) suggested that 
two attentional vectors in the two hemispheres inhibit one another, but one (in the 
right hemisphere) is stronger than the other.  These opposing models are illustrated in 
Figure 1.5.1.  In conclusion, both Heilman and Van Den Abell (1980) and 
Kinsbourne (1974) predict a leftward attentional bias in healthy individuals, but 
speculate contrary underlying mechanisms. 
 
                                        
A. Heilman and Van Den Abell’s (1980) model                                    B. Kinsbourne’s (1974) model 
 
Figure 1.5.1: Schematic representation of Heilman and Van Den Abell’s and Kinsbourne’s opposing 
models of the mechanisms underlying attention in healthy individuals. 
 
 
 
 
Left visual field Right visual field  
Left hemisphere Right hemisphere 
Left visual field Right visual field  
Left hemisphere Right hemisphere 
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1.5.2.  PSEUDONEGLECT 
Pseudoneglect refers to a phenomenon found in healthy individuals, in which 
both dextrals and sinistrals consistently and significantly err towards the left when 
asked to mark the midpoint of a visually presented horizontal line (e.g., Bowers & 
Heilman, 1980; Heilman et al., 1987; McCourt, Garlinghouse, & Reuter-Lorenz, 
2005; Nicholls & Loftus, 2007) 
Despite the phenomenon of pseudoneglect was initially dismissed by some 
authors (e.g. Mozer, Halligan & Marshall, 1997) as an artefact due to sampling error 
in small sample sizes. More recent research has refuted this criticism, thus 
acknowledging considerable variability and inconsistency in the degree to which 
participants err. Jewell and McCourt (2000) conducted a comprehensive meta-
analysis of the pseudoneglect literature comprising 73 studies and over 2000 
participants.  They reported that a number of factors seem to modulate pseudoneglect 
including age (older participants made more rightward errors that younger 
participants) (Fujii, Fukatsu, Yamadori, & Kimura, 1995; Stam & Bakker, 1990); 
handedness (right handed participants err slightly more to the left than left handed 
participants) (Luh, 1995; Scarisbrick, Tweedy, & Kuslansky, 1987); hand used to 
perform the task (the left hand produced more errors to the left than did the right 
hand) (e.g. Bradshaw et al., 1986; Brodie & Pettigrew, 1996; Suavansri, Falchook, 
Williamson & Heilman, 2012)  and, most significantly, the direction in which 
participants initiate motor scanning, with left-to-right scanning of the line producing 
more leftward errors and the reverse direction more rightward errors: e.g. Chokron et 
al., 1998).  Despite this wide variability in findings, Jewell and McCourt (2000) 
concluded from their meta-analysis that an overall leftward bisection error of 
moderate effect size does indeed exist.  More recent studies have now provided strong 
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support about this attentional bias in healthy volunteers. Indeed, some authors have 
reported evidence of pseudoneglect also with tactile stimuli (Brooks, Della Sala & 
Logie, 2012), representational stimuli (Cocchini, Watling, Jansari & Della Sala, 2007; 
Loftus, Nicholls, Mattingley, & Bradshaw, 2008; Nicholls & Loftus, 2007; Longo, 
Lourenco, Francisco, 2012; Darling, Logie & Della Sala, 2012) and it can be 
observed in everyday life tasks, such as walking through doors (Hatin, Tottenham, 
Sykes Oriet, 2012) or playing golf (Roberts & Turnbull, 2010). 
Pseudoneglect is, of course, the antithesis of spatial neglect in which patients 
err towards the right. A number of researchers (e.g. Heilman & Valenstein, 1979) 
have suggested that neglect patients make these errors because attention is directed 
towards the right, the effect being that the right side of the line is judged to be larger 
than it really is.  According to Kinsbourne’s model, it could similarly be argued that 
in healthy individuals the right hemisphere’s superior capacity for spatial attention 
results in the right hemisphere becoming more activated than the left when 
performing this task (Kinsbourne, 1970; 1974).  This would result in attention being 
more directed towards left hemispace so that the left side of the line is estimated as 
being larger than it actually is.  In line with this hypothesis, recent neuroimaging 
studies reported activation of the right posterior parietal areas in healthy volunteers 
performing visuo- spatial tasks (Foxe, McCourt, & Javitt, 2003; Harris & Miniussi, 
2003; Gobel, Calabria, Farné, & Rossetti, 2006).  Moreover, a recent study by Loftus 
and Nicholls (2012) using transcranial direct current stimulation (tDCS) reported that 
increased excitability of  the left posterior parietal cortex (by means of anodal  tDCS) 
resulted in reduced pseudoneglect, whereas no changes on pseudoneglect were found 
following tDCS (anodal, cathodal and sham) of the right posterior parietal cortex. 
These findings suggest that visuo-spatial attention is biased towards the field opposite 
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to the most activated hemisphere and that the ‘superiority’ of the right hemisphere is 
due to a hemispheric asymmetry of neural activity.  
Recent findings suggest that pseudoneglect may result from a left hemispace-
right hemispheric visuospatial attentional upward bias and a relative left hemispheric-
right hand upward action-intentional bias 
To date, there is no unifying theory that links the underlying mechanisms of 
pseudoneglect to those of spatial neglect, but from the evidence thus far it would 
seem reasonable to speculate that the two are intrinsically linked. 
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 1.6 Summary and thesis plan 
 Visual extinction is the tendency to ignore a contralesional stimulus when it is 
presented simultaneously with an ipsilesional one, whilst the ability to detect a 
contralesional stimulus when presented alone is preserved.  Extinction commonly 
occurs in patients following right hemisphere damage.  It is closely related to spatial 
neglect and the two disorders commonly co-occur, though the question of whether or 
not they are two discrete, dissociable disorders remains unresolved.  Evidence from 
neuroimaging does suggest that there are dissociable cortical substrates for neglect 
and extinction (Karnath, Himmelbach & Küker, 2003; Umarova et al., 2011). 
A number of factors have been found to modulate extinction including the 
perceptual grouping of stimuli on the basis of Gestalt factors (e.g. Ward, Goodrich & 
Driver, 1994; Mattingley, Davis & Driver (1997) and perceptual grouping of stimuli 
drawing on intrinsic knowledge of actions between objects and the top-down effect of 
cueing validity (e.g. Riddoch et al., 2003; Riddoch et al., 2006).  The dynamic nature 
of both bottom-up and top-down attentional processes in determining perceptual 
outcomes has recently been described by Geng and Behrmann (2006) as a ‘push-pull’ 
relationship in which competition for attentional selection is determined by a 
combination of top-down and bottom-up factors.   
An analogy can be drawn between extinction and an attentional limitation in 
healthy individuals in which two or more stimuli compete for attention.  Whilst this 
competition between stimuli in healthy individuals has not been shown to be biased 
towards left or right space, a general attentional inclination towards leftward space is 
reported in healthy participants.  This inclination is manifested in bisection tasks, in 
which healthy volunteers consistently err towards the left, a phenomenon known as 
pseudoneglect. 
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A key element of contemporary theories of attention (e.g. Bundesen, 1990; 
Desimone & Duncan, 1995; Duncan, 1996)  is the notion that stimuli compete for 
attention.  As such, extinction offers a unique insight into the effects of attention on 
perception and an opportunity to study how the brain represents space, attention and 
awareness and how these processes may be disrupted by brain injury. 
 This thesis examines how extinction-like phenomena can be induced in 
healthy adults via bottom-up processes (Chapter 2; Experiments 1, 2 and 3) and top-
down processes (Chapter 3; Experiment 4).  Chapter 4 investigates the responses of 
brain damaged patients to computerised tests of extinction (Experiments 5 and 6).   
Chapter 5 summarises and further discusses the findings reported herein in relation to 
competing stimuli in healthy adults and in brain damaged patients, and makes 
suggestions for future research. 
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Chapter 2                                           
Visual extinction in healthy volunteers using a 
bottom-up paradigm 
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2.1. Experiment 1 
 
Introduction  
 
 Clearly, the limitations of the visual and attentional systems create a 
competition for attention between the objects in the visual field and it seems 
reasonable to conclude that such a competition arises at an early stage of vision.  Very 
few studies have investigated in healthy participants the competition between 
simultaneous stimuli in both visual fields so clearly seen in visual extinction patients 
(e.g., Gorea & Sagi, 2000; 2002). Gorea & Sagi (2002) observed that “at least some 
forms of extinction (and perhaps neglect) are contingent on relative 
sensory/perceptual impairments”. Other studies have explored different competitive 
effects in visual processing. Farah, Monheit and Wallace (1991) responded to an 
earlier study by Volpe, Ledoux and Gazzaniga (1979) in which it was reported that 
patients were able to make same/different judgements about double simultaneous 
stimuli, despite ‘extinguishing’ the contralesional item, leading to the suggestion that 
both stimuli were perceived.  Farah et al. argued that less visual information about the 
contralesional stimulus is required to make a same/different judgement than to 
identify it.  To test this, Farah et al.’s first experiment reports degrading one side of a 
stimulus display with healthy volunteers and asking them either to decide whether or 
not the degraded stimulus was the same as a simultaneous intact stimulus, or to 
identify it in a forced-choice identification task.  It was found that the dissociation 
between identification and same/different matching disappeared.  In the light of Farah 
et al.’s investigations with healthy participants (and, subsequently, with three 
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extinction patients), the evidence for intact perception of ‘extinguished’ items was 
regarded as inconclusive. 
To test the hypothesis that healthy participants can detect either the location or 
features of briefly presented stimuli, but not both simultaneously, de Haan and 
Rorden (2004) presented healthy participants with three tasks: detect identity, detect 
location or detect identity and location.  Participants performed significantly above 
chance when reporting either identity or location alone, but when reporting both 
features performance was at chance level.  This suggests that, firstly, an attentional 
competition arises between simultaneous detection of identity and location and, 
secondly, information concerning identity and location can be preserved, even when 
both features are not bound together to generate awareness. 
Transcranial magnetic stimulation (TMS) has been used by a number of researchers 
to explore the effects of attentional competition in healthy volunteers for short periods 
of time.  In an early study, Pascual-Leone, Gomez-Tortosa, Grafman, Always, 
Nichelli and Hallett (1994) used an extinction paradigm to investigate the effects of 
rTMS on the occipital and parietal lobes in healthy volunteers.  They reported that 
occipital rTMS produced a large number of misses of the contralateral stimulus 
regardless of whether single or double stimuli were presented.  Parietal rTMS, on the 
other hand, reproduced the classic extinction phenomenon of misses of the 
contralateral stimulus only in double stimulation.  After Pascual-Leone et al. (1994) 
had established that it was possible to temporarily induce attentional deficits in 
healthy adults using TMS, a number of more recent studies have used the technique 
to empirically test specific neuropsychological models and constructs.  Hilgetag, 
Théoret, and Pascual-Leone (2001), for example, produced a model of neglect in 
healthy volunteers to test the hemispheric rivalry account of visual attention and 
found that found brief inhibition of the right or left parietal areas led to a shift of 
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attention towards the ipsilateral space.  Koch, Oliveri, Torriero and Caltagirone 
(2001) explored specific patterns of excitation and inhibition in the right parietal 
cortex using paired-pulse TMS (transcranial magnetic stimulation).  This technique 
enables stimulation with two distinct stimuli through the same coil at a range of 
different intervals; hence, different groups of neurons in the parietal cortex could be 
disrupted during visuospatial attention tasks.  Koch et al. reported that, compared 
with single-pulse TMS, paired-pulse TMS applied to the parietal cortex can either 
inhibit or enhance covert visuospatial attention, depending on the inter-stimulus 
intervals between pulses.  Dambeck, Sparing, Meister, Weinemann, Weidemann, 
Topper and Boroojerdi (2006) explored the effects of single-pulse TMS applied over 
one hemisphere alone, compared with simultaneous TMS over both the right and left 
posterior parietal cortex.  Their findings support the notion that an interhemispheric 
imbalance may underlie neglect and extinction.  Meister, Weinemann, Buelte, 
Grünewald, Sparing, Dambeck and Boroojerdi (2006) conducted a further study using 
TMS to investigate the functional role of the superior temporal gyrus and the 
temporo-parietal junction of the right hemisphere for visuospatial attention.  These 
studies demonstrate the twofold practicable uses of TMS in research with healthy 
volunteers: firstly in applying stimulation to different cortical areas in order to 
explore their role in underlying networks and secondly in temporarily mimicking 
patterns of neurological dysfunction in order to test specific hypotheses. 
The temporo-parietal junction (TPJ) has been identified by Corbetta and 
Shulman (2002) as part of the stimulus-driven (bottom-up) attentional network.  
Karnath, Himmelbach and Küker (2003) concurred with this view and demonstrated 
that the TPJ is the neural substrate of visual extinction, suggesting a strong link 
between bottom-up attentional processes and visual extinction.  
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 With this in mind, the aim of this experiment was to determine whether 
phenomena similar to those found in extinction patients could be produced in healthy 
adults using a bottom-up, stimulus-driven paradigm.  Stimuli that are salient against a 
neutral background are processed preferentially over less salient stimuli at nearly all 
levels of the visual system (Desimone & Duncan, 1985).  The argument for a bottom-
up basis for visual extinction can be made in the light of Karnath et al.’s (2003) 
observation that the temporo-parietal junction is the neural substrate of visual 
extinction and that this area is considered to be a crucial part of the stimulus-driven 
attentional network (see Section 1.4.2).  
 A second research question arising from this paradigm concerns any 
attentional bias that might occur towards left or right hemispace.  The phenomenon of 
pseudoneglect (Bowers & Heilman, 1980; Jewell & McCourt, 2000, and see pp.41-42 
herein) dictates that healthy individuals typically misjudge the mid-point of a 
horizontal stimulus by biasing their estimation towards the left.  This has been 
observed both in line bisection (e.g. (McCourt, 2001) and judgements of luminance, 
for example the Greyscales Task (Mattingley et al., 2004), in which horizontal stimuli 
are shaded on a gradient from black to white.  In contrast to the leftward attentional 
bias displayed in pseudoneglect, there is a known rightward bias in the case of 
reading and eye movements, which is manifested in perceptual reading span.  In 
English readers, more letters to the right of fixation can be processed than those to the 
left, and this bias is reversed in readers of languages such as Hebrew that are read 
from right to left (Pollatsek, Bolozky, Well, & Rayner, 1981).  It therefore seems 
reasonable to conclude that attention is not distributed symmetrically in healthy 
individuals, hence the current study sought to determine whether any asymmetry 
would be detected. Previous studies have reported different performance with stimuli 
displayed on either the left or the right side of space (e.g. Dallenbach, 1920; Davidoff, 
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1975; 1976; 1977). The asymmetry mainly depended on a combination of various 
features of the stimulus and type of response (e.g. verbal or non-verbal).  Gorea and 
Sagi (2002) investigated hemifield advantage during double stimulation with five 
healthy volunteers. The authors observed a quite heterogeneous pattern of data, where 
two participants showed an advantage, in terms of higher sensitivity, for the stimulus 
presented on the left hemifield, one participant showed the opposite pattern of data 
and two participants showed a similar sensitivity across the two hemifields. Further 
studies with larger samples can provide further indication of possible hemifield 
asymmetry during a competitive attentional task.  
Therefore, in Experiment 1, it was predicted that fewer correct responses in 
identifying pairs of items displayed on a computer screen would be made when one 
item was bright and the other dim, and that the ‘extinguished’ items would be those of 
a dim luminance.  A secondary research question concerned the possibility of any 
attentional bias towards one or other visual field.   
  
 
 
Method 
Participants 
Fourteen healthy adults took part in the study, of whom eleven were female 
and three male.  Their ages ranged from 18 to 51 (mean age = 28.6 years, SD = 
10.23).  All participants were right handed and had normal or corrected vision. 
 
Apparatus 
The experiment was constructed using E-Prime software and run on a 
Windows 98 desktop computer, presented on a 28cm x 21cm monitor.  The refresh 
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rate was 100 Hz (i.e. the frame duration was 10 ms), thus the stimulus was displayed 
synchronous with the retrace events.  Stimulus items were therefore set to multiples 
of 10 msec.  Participants viewed the screen from a chin and forehead rest positioned 
50cm in front of the screen.  The visual angle subtended at the eye by the viewing 
area at this distance was 32° horizontally and 24° vertically.  Testing took place in a 
room with no natural light; a dimmer switch on an overhead light was set half way 
between full on and off, and this precise light setting was maintained for all test 
sessions.  Participants responded to stimuli via three buttons on a response box and 
accuracy was recorded.  Exposure duration, recording of response accuracy and 
randomisation of the trials were controlled by the computer. 
 
Stimuli 
The stimuli are illustrated in Figure 2.1.1.  A grey fixation cross, 1.15° high 
and wide, was displayed in the centre of the screen.  Stimulus items consisted of 
vertical lines 1.72° long and 0.23° wide.  They were green in colour and were either 
of a bright or dim luminance, presented against a dark grey background.  In the 
bilateral presentations, the distance between the stimuli was 16cm. (18.18°).  There 
were six possible stimulus displays, of which four were unilateral: a single bright line 
on the left (Bright/Blank); a single bright line on the right (Blank/Bright); a single 
dim line on the left (Dim/Blank); a single dim line on the right (Blank/Dim), and two 
were bilateral and of mixed luminance: a bright line on the left and a dim line on the 
right (Bright/Dim); a dim line on the left and a bright line on the right (Dim/Bright).  
Settings of the background and stimuli are presented in Table 2.1.1. 
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Table 2.1.1: Settings of Background and Stimuli    
 Luminance 
(cd/m
2
) 
Saturation Luminance Red Green Blue 
Background 0.15 0 59 63 63 63 
Bright 
Stimulus 
7.69 240 120 0 255 64 
Dim 
Stimulus 
0.56 240 38 0 81 40 
 
 
 
Figure 2.1.1: A schematic representation of an experimental trial.  In each trial, a central fixation 
cross appeared on the screen, followed after a randomized delay by a stimulus event (in this example, 
a bilateral trial shown with a dim stimulus on the left and a bright one on the right).  Stimuli remained 
on the screen for the duration determined by individual titration and were followed by the words 
“Respond now”.  After a response was made the fixation cross re-appeared.   
 
 
Procedure 
The procedure consisted of a short titration session, followed by the 
experimental session (see below).  No feedback was given during either session. 
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Titration  
In order to allow for individual differences in the ability to perceive stimuli 
presented for very short durations a preliminary test, a titration phase, was run prior to 
the experiment. The purpose of the titration phase was to determine the threshold of 
the shortest duration for which the stimuli could be presented on the screen and 
accurately perceived by the participant, whilst not at ceiling.  Twelve trials were run 
displaying unilateral dim stimulus arrays, each with a duration of 80ms, and 
participants were asked to fixate on the cross in the centre of the screen, and indicate 
verbally on each trial whether they had noticed an item on the left of the screen, the 
right, or none at all (in every trial, at least one stimulus was displayed).  Responses 
were noted on a check sheet by the experimenter and the exposure time for the 
experiment was set according to the criteria presented in Table 2.1.2.  The range of 
stimulus durations was determined by a pilot study, in which stimuli were run at 
exposure durations ranging from 50ms to 150 ms with five participants (3 female, 2 
male; age range 22 – 42, mean age = 29.2 years, SD = 7.85).  
 
Table 2.1.2: Criteria for stimulus duration 
 
% of correct responses at 80ms 
 
0% - 60% 
 
65% - 80% 
 
85% - 100% 
 
Action 
Repeat titration 
test with 100ms 
duration 
Run experiment 
with 80ms 
duration 
Repeat titration 
test with 60ms 
duration 
 
 
If between 65% and 80% of responses were correct, then the experiment was 
run with stimulus durations of 80msec  If, on the other hand, fewer than 65% of 
responses were correct the titration test was repeated with longer stimulus durations; 
any participant who still reported 60% or fewer items correctly was excluded from 
the study.  Similarly, if 85% or more responses were correct the titration test was 
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repeated with briefer stimulus durations; any participant who still reported 85% or 
more items correctly was excluded from the study. 
 
 
Experimental Session 
Prior to the commencement of each experimental task the participants read a 
series of instructions which were presented on the display screen.  Participants were 
instructed to fixate on the cross in the centre of the screen which would disappear 
after a second.  Following a randomized delay ranging from 1000 to 2500 ms, a 
stimulus event appeared on the screen for the duration determined by the titration 
phase (between 60 and 100 ms).  Stimulus exposure times remained constant for each 
participant throughout the experimental procedure.  The stimuli were presented on the 
screen and participants were asked to indicate whether they saw a line only on the 
left, on both sides of the screen, or only on the right by pressing buttons labeled ‘R’, 
‘L’ or ‘B’ respectively with the index finger of their dominant (right) hand.  Each 
stimulus was followed by the words “Respond now” and the participant’s response 
was indicated by a button press which initiated the reappearance of the fixation point 
and the next stimulus event on the screen.  The participant’s response hand remained 
positioned over the three-button response box throughout the procedure.  A practice 
session consisting of 12 trials was run, after which Experiment 1 followed.  The 
experiment consisted of 96 trials of randomly presented stimuli of which 32 were 
bilateral (dim one side and bright the other side), 32 unilateral dim (16 left and 16 
right) and 32 unilateral bright (16 left and 16 right). 
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Results 
 
Despite titration, one participant’s data were excluded from the final analysis 
because her performance was too poor and at more than 3 standard deviations from 
the group mean on Bright/Blank and Blank/Bright trials.  On the data from the 
remaining 13 participants, analyses were carried out on error responses in order to 
ascertain (1) whether an extinction effect could be observed and, if so, (2) whether 
there was any effect of the side (left or right) on which the dim stimuli were 
extinguished.  Means and standard errors of participants’ performance on each 
condition are presented in Figure 2.1.2.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2.1.2: Means and standard errors of errors in all conditions  
 
Reporting of errors in bilateral conditions always represents detection only of 
the bright stimulus.  Only one participant indicated seeing a dim stimulus and missing 
a bright stimulus on a single bilateral trial; the remaining participants saw the bright 
stimulus and missed the dim one on bilateral trials in which detection of only one 
stimulus was reported. 
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As can be seen in Figure 2.1.2, detection of unilateral bright stimuli was at 
ceiling, whereas means of errors in detecting unilateral dim stimuli on the left and 
right were 30.2% and 33.2% respectively, suggesting that the titration phase 
accurately discerned the optimal threshold at which individuals could detect dim 
stimuli in isolation, whilst not at ceiling.  The presentation of a bright stimulus had a 
detrimental effect on detection of the dim stimulus.  Indeed, whilst errors in unilateral 
dim stimuli were on average 31.7%, errors increased to a mean of 52.1% in bilateral 
presentations, in which a bright stimulus appeared with a dim one. 
An omnibus ANOVA analysed Display Type (unilateral bright, unilateral 
dim, bilateral) x Visual Field (bright stimulus in left field and/or dim stimulus in right 
field) and revealed a main effect of display type (F (2,24) = 27.51, p < .001,  ηp2 = 
.696), no main effect of visual field and no interaction.  Pairwise comparisons 
adjusted with Bonferroni correction revealed significant differences between the 
unilateral bright and unilateral dim conditions (p < .05), between the unilateral bright 
and bilateral conditions (p < .001) and between the unilateral dim and bilateral 
conditions (p < .05).   
Whilst there was some value in running the initial 3 x 2 ANOVA in order to 
report all possible effects, there was a limitation in comparing bilateral conditions 
with unilateral dim and unilateral bright conditions.  Thus, two subsequent 2 x 2 
ANOVA analyses were run to compare unilateral dim and bilateral conditions, and 
unilateral bright and bilateral conditions.  The first of these analysed display type 
(unilateral dim, bilateral) x visual field in which the dim stimulus appeared (left, 
right) and revealed a main effect of display type (F (1, 12) = 9.27, p = .01, ηp2 = 
.436).  The second analysed display type (unilateral dim, bilateral) x visual field in 
which the bright stimulus appeared (left, right) and revealed a main effect of display 
type (F (1,12) = 45.85, p < .001, ηp2 = .793).   
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Discussion 
   
It was expected that when either bright or dim stimuli were presented singly in 
either the left or right visual field they would be detected in most cases.  When one 
bright stimulus appeared concurrently with a dim stimulus, it was expected that the 
bright stimulus would be perceived and the dim one ‘extinguished’ because attention 
would be drawn towards the bright stimulus and away from the dim one.  In 
attempting to draw an analogy between extinction and an extinction-like response in 
healthy individuals by inducing visual impoverishment, the experimental hypothesis 
relied heavily on the assumption that extinction is attention-based. In line with recent 
studies (e.g. Gorea & Sagi, 2002) the results suggest that, in double stimulation, 
attention is captured by the bright stimulus, which shifts attention away from the dim 
stimulus.  This notion is consistent with Ward, Goodrich and Driver’s (1994) account 
of extinction, in which the contralesional item is disadvantaged in the competition for 
selection.   
As expected, accuracy in perceiving dim stimuli was significantly reduced 
when bright stimuli were presented simultaneously with a dim one, strongly 
suggesting that extinction can be reliably simulated in healthy participants.  
Unsurprisingly a ceiling effect was found in both unilateral bright conditions 
(Bright/Blank and Blank/Bright) and, whilst accuracy was considerably reduced in 
both unilateral dim conditions (Dim/Blank and Blank/Dim) there was a significant 
difference between accuracy in detection of stimuli in the dim unilateral and bilateral 
conditions.  This suggests that dim stimuli can be perceived when presented alone, 
but are less likely to be perceived when a simultaneous bright stimulus is competing 
for attention.  Moreover, perception of unilateral dim stimuli was relatively high, 
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suggesting that the titration test was effective in determining individual thresholds at 
which dim stimuli could be perceived. 
Given the known attentional biases in healthy individuals (e.g. Davidoff, 
1976; 1977; Bowers & Heilman, 1980; Heilman et al., 1987; McCourt, Garlinghouse 
& Reuter-Lorenz, 2005; Pollatsek, Bolozky, Well & Rayner, 1981), it was expected 
that such a bias would show itself in the current paradigm.  It was therefore surprising 
that no effect of visual field was found. It may be that accuracy is too rough a 
measure for detection of any bias towards one or other hemifield and that response 
times would give a more accurate account.  Since participants were required to move 
their index finger between three buttons on a response box, response times were not 
measured in the current experiment. With this in mind, Experiment 2 aimed to further 
explore any differences in response times. In conclusion, the findings from 
Experiment 1 are in line with the idea that phenomena similar to those observed in 
extinction patients can be produced in healthy adults.  A dim stimulus, whilst 
perceived when presented alone, becomes ‘extinguished’ when presented 
concurrently with a more salient stimulus.  There appears not to be any effect of 
laterality in healthy volunteers, however methodological issues may have prevented 
the detection of any such effect.  Experiment 2 addressed these methodological 
issues. 
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2.2. Experiment 2 
 
Introduction 
 
 Mattingley and colleagues (Mattingley, Bradshaw, Nettleton & Bradshaw, 
1994; Mattingley, Berborovic, Corben, Slavin, Nicholls & Bradshaw, 2004) reported 
that, in the greyscales task (a task more sensitive to attentional bias than the line 
bisection task), healthy controls showed a small but significant leftward bias, 
implying a subtle asymmetry favouring the right hemisphere.  This finding is in line 
with the phenomenon of pseudoneglect (e.g. Suavansri et al., 2012) Davidoff (1975) 
found hemispheric differences in the perception of lightness, with right handed 
participants reporting coloured and grey stimuli as lighter when they were presented 
to the left visual field, suggesting that the role of the right hemisphere (at least in 
right-handed participants) is important in visual perception.  Later research (Davidoff, 
1976) found a similar right hemisphere superiority in the discrimination of both hue 
and saturation.  Davidoff (1977) noted that there is also a left visual field/right 
hemisphere advantage for the detection of dots and suggested that the right 
hemisphere is responsible for the perception of simple stimuli, regardless of the visual 
field in which they appear.  There is ample evidence to suggest that the activity of 
each hand is notably lateralized in the opposite hemisphere (Sperry, 1964; Springer & 
Deutsch, 1981).  Handedness and hand used in responding can affect the attentional 
bias (Bradshaw et al., 1986; Brodie & Pettigrew, 1996; Suavansri et al., 2012). As a 
result of this, ipsilateral responses (e.g. the right hand responding to a right visual 
field stimulus) are always faster than contralateral responses (e.g. the right hand 
responding to a left visual field stimulus) by around 2-10 milliseconds (Berlucchi, 
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Crea, Di Stefano & Tassinari, 1977; Anzola, Bertolini, Buchtel & Rizzolatti, 1977).  
Verfaellie and Heilman (1990) found a similar pattern with invalidly cued stimuli 
both in left and right hemispace and reported that cueing attention to the right side of 
space resulted in faster response times for the right than the left hand.  In contrast, no 
difference between hands was found when attention was directed to the left space.  
Drawing on the distinction and interaction between perceptual attention and motor 
intention, the authors suggested that the left hand is primarily prepared for response 
when attention is directed towards left hemispace, while the right hand is prepared for 
response to stimuli in either hemispace.  An alternative hypothesis is that the left hand 
(controlled by the right hemisphere, which is known to be more efficient in 
visuospatial processing than the left hemisphere) should be faster at reaction times 
involving spatial relationships, e.g. target detection.  This notion is supported by 
Boulinguez and Barthelemy (2000) and Barthelemy and Boulinguez (2001 and 2002).  
In a simple reaction time experiment, for example, Barthelemy and Boulinguez  
(2001) reported shorter reaction times when the left hand was used for releasing a 
switch after the appearance of a target and for performing pointing movements 
towards the same target, suggesting right hemisphere dominance for movement 
planning. 
There is further clear support for specialisation of the right hemisphere in 
attending to both left and right sides of space compared with the left hemisphere’s 
role in attending to right space.  Such evidence comes from physiological studies (e.g. 
Corbetta, Miezin, Shulman & Petersen, 1993; Heilman & van Den Abell, 1980; 
Proverbio, Zani, Gazzaniga & Mangun, 1994) and from the prevalence of unilateral 
neglect after right hemisphere damage (Gainotti, Messerli & Tissot, 1972; Weintraub 
& Mesulam, 1989). However in double stimulation paradigms, findings about 
asymmetry in healthy volunteers are still under debate. Gorea & Sagi (2002) reported 
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a relatively high heterogeneous pattern of data despite the fact that all five 
participants were exposed to the same bilateral stimuli. In the previous Experiment 
the lack of asymmetry for one or the other hemifield may be attributed to a 
methodological issue in that response times were not collected This experiment was 
designed to address and extend the findings of Experiment 1 in which no bias was 
found towards either hemispace.  It may be that measurement of accuracy alone is 
insufficient to detect any such bias, and an additional factor could be that the previous 
experiment lacked statistical power.  Experiment 2 aimed to address both of these 
issues, the former by revising the procedure so that reaction times could be reliably 
collected, and the latter by increasing the number of trials.   
 
 
Method 
Participants 
Fifteen healthy adults took part in the study, of whom thirteen were female 
and two male.  Their ages ranged from 18 to 28 (mean age = 20.2 years, SD = 2.65).  
All participants were right handed and had normal or corrected vision. 
 
Apparatus 
The experiment was constructed using E-Prime software and run on a 
Windows 98 desktop computer, presented on a 28cm x 21cm visual display screen.  
Participants viewed the screen from a chin and forehead rest positioned 50cm in front 
of the screen.  The visual angle subtended at the eye by the viewing area at this 
distance was 32° horizontally and 24° vertically.  Testing took place in a room with 
no natural light; a dimmer switch was set half way between full on and off, and the 
precise light setting was maintained for all test sessions.  Participants responded to 
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stimuli by pressing a single button on a response box and accuracy and response 
times were recorded.  Exposure duration, recording of response accuracy and 
response times and randomisation of the trials were all controlled by the computer. 
 
Stimuli 
Stimuli were identical to those in Experiment 1. 
 
Procedure 
The procedure consisted of a short titration task (identical to that employed in 
Experiment 1, see p.48), followed by the experimental session (see below).  No 
feedback was given during either session. 
 
Experimental Session 
Prior to the commencement of the experimental session, participants read a 
series of instructions which were presented on the display screen.  Participants were 
instructed to fixate on the cross in the centre of the screen which would disappear 
after a second.  Following a randomized delay ranging from 1000 to 2500 ms, a 
stimulus event appeared on the screen for the duration determined by the titration 
phase (either 60, 80 or 100 ms).  Stimulus exposure times remained constant for each 
participant throughout the experimental procedure.  The stimuli were presented on the 
screen and participants were asked to press the button on the response box as quickly 
as possible only if they saw a single stimulus, but do nothing if they saw two stimuli. 
In this way, ‘extinction’ responses (i.e. those in which two stimuli were presented, but 
only one perceived) as well as responses to single stimuli were recorded.  For each 
participant there were two blocks of trials in which they responded with the index 
finger of the left hand and two with the index finger of the right hand.  In total, 192 
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trials were randomly presented in four blocks of 48 trials, each block consisting of 16 
bilateral trials, 16 unilateral dim trials and 16 unilateral bright trials.  Response hand 
was counterbalanced across participants using an ABBA design.  A practice session 
consisting of 6 trials was run prior to the experimental data collection.   
 
 
Results 
 
Both accuracy and response times were considered in this experiment.  Means 
and standard errors of (a) error performance and (b) response times in all conditions 
are presented in Figures 2.2.1 and 2.2.2 respectively. 
 
 
Figure 2.2.1: Means and standard errors of errors (%) as a function of response hand in all 
conditions 
 
Inspection of the response time data revealed some extreme outlying scores, 
all of which represented delayed responses.  Seventeen individual scores (0.6% of the 
data set) across all participants were more than 3 standard deviations from the means, 
and all were excluded from the final analysis.   
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Figure 2.2.2: Means and standard errors of response times (in milliseconds) as a function of response 
hand in all conditions 
 
Doubly multivariate repeated measures analyses with Display Type (unilateral 
bright, unilateral dim, bilateral), Visual Field (bright stimulus in left field and/or dim 
stimulus in right field) and Response Hand (left, right) as repeated measures and 
Errors and Response Times as dependent variables revealed a main effect of display 
type (Wilks’ λ = .132, F (4,54) = 23.67, p < .001, ηp2 = .637).  All other effects were 
non-significant.  
The relationship between errors and response rates is illustrated in Figure 
2.2.3.   
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Figure 2.2.3: Mean errors as a function of response times 
 
As Figure 2.2.3 shows, this relationship differs between the three display type 
conditions (unilateral bright, unilateral dim, bilateral).  The variables in each of the 
three conditions are clearly clustered together, with unilateral bright displays having 
fast response times and no or very few errors, unilateral dim displays having the 
slowest response times and a moderate number of errors and bilateral displays having 
moderate response times and the highest number of errors.  This pattern suggests a 
speed-accuracy trade-off between the unilateral dim and bilateral conditions.  When a 
conflict arises between RT and error rates, as here, inverse efficiency measures can 
provide a method of comparing overall performance between conditions (e.g. 
Townsend & Ashby, 1983; Davis, Driver, Pavani & Shepherd, 2000; Goffaux, Hault, 
Michel, Vuong & Roisson, 2005; Falter, Arroyo & Davis, 2006; Shore, Barnes & 
Spence, 2006; Kiss, Driver & Eimer, 2009). The inverse efficiency score (expressed 
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in ms) is equal to the mean RT divided by the proportion of correct responses, 
calculated separately for each condition.  This measure was calculated for each of the 
twelve conditions and efficiency data were analysed in an omnibus ANOVA (Display 
Type (unilateral bright, unilateral dim, bilateral) x Visual Field (bright left and/or dim 
right) x Response Hand (left, right)) which yielded a main effect of display type 
(Wilks’ λ = .108, F (2,13) = 53.78, p < .001, ηp2 = .892), no main effect of visual 
field (Wilks’ λ = .972, F (1, 14) = .41, p = .53, ηp2 = .028) and no main effect of 
response hand, but a trend towards significance (Wilks’ λ = .760, F (1, 14) = 4.43, p = 
.054, ηp2 = .240) and no interactions.  Bonferroni adjusted post hoc comparisons for 
Display Type revealed significant differences between unilateral bright and unilateral 
dim (p < .001) and, as a relevant comparison, between unilateral bright and bilateral 
stimuli (i.e. when only the bright stimulus was attended) (p < .001), but not between 
unilateral dim and bilateral conditions (p > .05).  
 
 
 
Discussion 
As in Experiment 1, participants made more errors in bilateral displays than in 
unilateral dim displays, supporting the notion that there is a cost of competition in 
detecting a stimulus when it appears concurrently with a second, more salient 
stimulus.  Comparison of response times between bilateral and unilateral dim 
conditions failed to reach significance.  
The finding that there was a highly significant difference in response times 
between the two unilateral conditions (response times were faster in unilateral bright 
displays than unilateral dim displays) supports the literature on reaction times in 
relation to stimulus intensity.  Piéron (1920) and Luce (1986), cited in Kosinsky 
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(2009), reported that the weaker a stimulus is, (e.g. a very faint light) the longer the 
response time is, but once a stimulus reaches a certain intensity, reaction time 
becomes constant.  This can be illustrated as in Figure 2.2.4. 
 
 
Figure 2.2.4: Reaction time as a function of stimulus intensity (from Kosinski, 
2009). 
 
Turning to the relationship between errors and response times, there were 
three distinct clusters of error/response time associations, clearly grouped according 
to the three display types.  Unsurprisingly, unilateral bright displays evoked few 
errors and fast responses.  Moreover, bilateral stimuli elicited more errors because 
participants falsely identified them as unilateral bright displays as they failed to detect 
the dim stimuli in bilateral trials. Interestingly, the bilateral stimuli (incorrectly 
perceived as unilateral bright) elicited significantly slower responses compared to 
unilateral bright, suggesting that the presence of the dim extinguished stimulus 
delayed participants’ response to the simultaneous bright stimulus. This may imply a 
form a competition for which both stimuli (bright and dim) pay a ‘cost’; the dim was 
not detected but the bright was detected more slowly.  What is questionable, however, 
is whether the dim stimuli would have been detected if the arrays had been displayed 
for longer durations.  It may be that the dim stimuli had not yet entered awareness.  
An interesting outcome showed that reaction times related to bilateral displays (i.e. 
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when the participants incorrectly considered that only the bright stimulus was 
displayed) were higher than in unilateral bright displays even when the inverted 
efficiency scores were considered, suggesting a ‘cost for competition’ for the detected 
bright stimulus even when the dim one was extinguished.  
There was no evidence of an advantage in terms of accuracy or in response 
times to either visual field, regardless of the hand used to make the response despite 
claims in the literature that response times to stimuli appearing in the field ipsilateral 
to the response hand are generally faster (Berlucchi et al., 1977; Anzola et al., 1977).  
Given the negligible difference in response times (2–10 milliseconds) reported in 
these studies, one could argue that the failure to find such an effect in this experiment 
may be due to a lack of statistical power.  Nevertheless, in a similar task, Verfaellie 
and Heilman (1990) reported larger differences (in the order of 35-50 milliseconds) 
between responses with the ipsilateral and contralateral hands to invalid stimuli in 
both hemispaces, with a relatively small sample (24 participants) so this explanation 
seems unlikely.  However, unlike paradigms used in the first two experiments 
reported herein, Verfaellie and Heilman (1990) used a top-down paradigm, that may 
have induce a different distribution of attention and that will be considered Chapter 3 
of this thesis.  
In conclusion, the data supported the extinction interpretation made in 
Experiment 1 and also revealed a significant effect of display type with faster 
response times to bright stimuli in unilateral than bilateral conditions, suggesting a 
cost of competition also for the ‘strong’ stimulus.  No significant lateral biases were 
found however, either in terms of faster responses to one visual field per se, or in 
terms of faster responses to the field ipsilateral to the response hand, although there 
was one anomalous finding that is hard to explain.  
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The experiments reported thus far have relied on detection of simple lines that 
appeared as either bright or dim.  The literature suggests that detection or absence of 
individual stimuli relies on very early visual processing mechanism, in which features 
are encoded in parallel, but that the more demanding task of identification of features 
draws on more limited resources where features are encoded serially (Treisman & 
Gelade, 1980; Broadbent & Broadbent, 1987).  With this in mind, it may be that a 
new experiment designed to test identification of features might be a more useful 
measure of investigating other aspects of attention competition between visual stimuli 
in healthy participants.  
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2.3. Experiment 3 
 
 
Introduction 
 
Experiments 1 and 2 employed a simple detection task paradigm, in which 
participants had only to note the presence or absence of a stimulus in one or other 
visual field.  There is evidence to suggest that whether or not extinction occurs in 
brain-damaged patients is influenced by task demands (Volpe et al., 1979; Bisiach et 
al., 1989; Smania et al., 1996; Vuilleumier and Rafal, 2000). With this in mind, 
Experiment 3 was designed to investigate whether extinction-type errors could be 
seen in healthy volunteers using a bottom-up paradigm in a test that requires 
identification of stimuli, rather than simple detection as used in Experiments 1 and 2.  
Identification may recruit more complex cognitive processes, being a more complex 
and demanding task than simple detection. With this in mind, the participants' task in 
the current study was to identify characteristic shapes that comprised circles, triangles 
and squares (a task that would presumably entail the recruitment of enhanced 
attentional processing, as compared to the simple discrimination task employed in 
Experiments 1 and 2).  Two of these shapes appeared simultaneously on the screen, 
one with higher contrast values than the other.  It was proposed that the shape with 
higher contrast would be perceived as more salient than the other and therefore spatial 
attention would be directed towards the more salient shape and, because of the 
complexity of the identification task, this would reduce the amount of available 
resources for processing the shape outside of the locus of attention.  A strength of the 
design and one that increased task demands was the degree of difficulty in 
discriminating between shapes; the shapes used in the current study were overall less 
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prototypical than the geometric patterns usually assigned to circles, triangles and 
squares as their corners and edges were reshaped to form a more homogenous overall 
set (see Figure 2.3.1 for examples of stimuli used).  It would be expected that 
participants would be required to expend extra resources because the three shapes 
were very similar exemplars.  In order to perform the task, participants had to make 
fine-grained discriminations, as in the case of a within-category discrimination task 
where exemplars have a highly similar overall shape (e.g. the identification of 
individual faces), as compared to basic-level identification where participants 
discriminate between shapes that differ in their overall characteristics (e.g. a car as 
compared to a dog).  Evidence for such a finding is usually based on differences in 
reaction time for within- versus basic-level categorization tasks.  For a discussion of 
this issue, see Mack and Palmeri (2011).  In order to increase statistical power, more 
trials than in Experiment 2 were presented.   
Whilst in Experiments 1 and 2, extinction was found in a simple detection 
task, the current study is employing a more demanding identification task, and 
therefore it would be expected that extinction would still occur, but perhaps to a 
greater degree in line with the predictions made by Lavie's perceptual load theory 
(1995).  For this reason, it was predicted that, in line with the results of Experiments 1 
and 2, when participants made a simple task detection there will be greater accuracy 
for a unilateral non-salient stimulus as compared to a non-salient stimulus presented 
simultaneously with a salient shape when participants perform an identification task.  
Saliency models predict that a spatial contrast can enhance visual inputs so 
that items become more salient in certain background contexts.  Accordingly, in a 
bottom-up paradigm, when shapes are presented with a more intense colour it is 
expected that participants’ attention will be directed based on bottom-up saliency-
driven mechanisms (e.g., Itti, Koch & Niebur, 1998).   
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Method 
 Participants 
 
Twenty healthy adults took part in the study, of whom thirteen were female 
and seven male.  Their ages ranged from 20 to 32 (mean age = 24.63 years, SD = 
2.77).  All had normal or corrected vision. 
 
Apparatus 
The experiment was constructed using E-Prime software and run on a 
Windows 98 desktop computer, presented on a 40.5 x 30.3 monitor.  Participants 
viewed the screen from a chin and forehead rest positioned 40.5cm from the monitor.  
The centre of each shape was 4
o
 from the mid-point of the screen.  A grey fixation 
cross was used to focus participants' attention on the centre of the screen.  Testing 
took place in a room with no natural light; a dimmer switch on an overhead light was 
set half way between on and off and this precise light setting was maintained for all 
test sessions.  Participants responded verbally to stimuli and responses were recorded 
via a keyboard by the experimenter.  Exposure duration, randomisation of the trials 
were controlled by the computer, 
 
Stimuli 
Three shapes were used as target stimuli; a circle, square and triangle.  The 
corners and edges of the square and triangle were slightly rounded in order to make 
discrimination between the three shapes more difficult.  The shape of stimuli was 
controlled so that each was of approximately the same size (0.8cm
2
).  Shapes 
appeared as light grey with a luminance of 181 (dim) or dark grey with a luminance 
of 89 (bright) against a white background.  The dim or less salient stimuli are 
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illustrated in Figure 2.3.1.  Shapes and saliency appeared randomly and with equal 
probability to the left or right side of fixation.  There were 168 trials, as shown in 
Table 2.3.1.  These consisted of 72 unilateral displays and 96 bilateral displays. 
The less salient stimuli are illustrated in Figure 2.3.1.     
 
 
                 
 
Figure 2.3.1: Examples of stimulus items 
 
 
 
Table 2.3.1: Stimulus displays 
 
Procedure 
The procedure consisted of a short titration task (identical to that employed in 
Experiments 1 and 2), followed by the experimental phase (see below). No feedback 
was given during the testing session. 
 
 
 
 Left Right 
 Stimulus Strength (Luminance) 
Unilateral (18 trials) Bright  
Unilateral (18 trials) Dim  
Unilateral (18 trials)  Bright 
Unilateral (18 trials)  Dim 
   
Bilateral (48 trials) Bright Dim 
Bilateral (48 trials) Dim Bright 
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Experimental Session 
At the start of the experiment, participants received a set of instructions that 
appeared on the computer monitor, informing the participants about the sequence of 
events during each trial.  A fixation appeared in the centre of the screen.  After this, 
either a single shape would appear on one side of fixation or two shapes for a fixed 
duration based on individual performance on the titration task.  For example, if 
participants' accuracy was over 90% on the titration task the standard duration was set 
to 53 msec. for both unilateral and bilateral displays.  If response accuracy was under 
65% duration was set to 97 msec.  For any performance between 65 and 90%, 
duration was set at 75 msec. as this indicated no floor or ceiling effects.  Immediately 
after each presentation participants were required to make a verbal response 
indicating the identity and location of the shape or shapes seen.  Responses were 
recorded on a keyboard by the experimenter, with specific keys assigned to each of 
the shapes and locations.  Keys ‘A’, ‘S’ and ‘D’ indicated responses to shapes on the 
left and ‘J’, ‘K’ and ‘L’ to shapes on the right.  In cases where participants did not 
perceive anything on a particular side of space they were instructed to say the word 
“nothing”, in which case the experimenter would press the spacebar.  If they 
perceived something but could not identify the shape explicitly, they were instructed 
to say “I don’t know”, and the experimenter would press ‘E’ (left) or ‘U’ (right).  In 
this way, a response was always recorded for left and right. Half of the participants 
reported the left stimulus first; the other half followed the opposite order. There was 
no time limit and participants were advised to take as long as necessary and focus on 
accuracy.  Participants were offered a short break after approximately every 50 trials.  
No feedback was given during the test sessions. 
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Results 
 
One participant’s overall score (<20%) was significantly below the overall 
group mean so it was excluded from further analysis.  Figure 2.3.2 shows mean 
accuracy for each condition. 
 
 
Figure 2.3.2: Mean (%) errors and standard error.  Dark grey,  light grey and black bars 
indicate errors in unilateral dim, bilateral and unilateral bright displays respectively. 
 
Average percentage of error for bright stimuli was lower than average error for dim 
stimuli.  Participants’ performance with dim stimuli was worse in unilateral than bilateral 
conditions.  
A 2 x 2 x 2 repeated measures ANOVA was run with location on screen (left/right) x 
condition (unilateral/bilateral) x strength (dim/bright).  A main effect was found for the 
strength of the target shape (F (1, 17) = 170.04, p < .001) with less accuracy for dim 
stimuli.  There was also a main effect of condition (F (1, 17) = 6.08, p < .05).  The 
location in which a target shape appeared had no significant effect on performance.  
There was an interaction between condition and strength (F (1, 17) = 22.02, p < .001).  
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Corrected pairwise comparisons revealed that performance with dim stimuli in 
unilateral trials was significantly worse than in bilateral trials (t (18) = 4.12, p = .001).     
 
  
Discussion 
 
Interestingly, an extinction pattern of errors was not found; indeed 
significantly more errors were made in identifying dim stimuli when they appeared 
alone than when they were accompanied by a bright stimulus in the opposite field.  
The finding that processing of a stimulus can be enhanced rather than suppressed by a 
second stimulus has been reported (albeit rarely) in the literature and has been termed 
the ‘anti-extinction’ effect (Goodrich & Ward, 1997; Humphreys, Riddoch, Nys and 
Heinke, 2002).  Anti-extinction is defined as “poor report of a single stimulus 
presented on the contralesional side of space, but better report of the same item when 
it occurs concurrently with a stimulus on the ipsilesional side” (Humphreys et al., 
2002,  p. 361).  This pattern of errors is particularly interesting because it seems to 
contradict the assumption that stimuli compete for attention in a limited capacity 
system (Broadbent, 1958; Neisser, 1967; Desimone & Duncan, 1995; Ward, 
Goodrich & Driver, 1994). 
It would be hard to explain this apparent anti-extinction effect in healthy 
participants in terms of a biased competition model; if it were the case that a stimulus 
loses out in the competition for attention in the presence of a second stimulus, one 
would expect identification of a dim stimulus to be worse when there was a 
concurrent bright stimulus in the opposite field. A number of alternative explanations 
are discussed with reference to the anti-extinction literature with a clinical population. 
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The idea that processing of a contralesional stimulus is primed by a concurrent 
ipsilesional stimulus is proposed by Goodrich and Ward (1997) in their report of 
patient VH.  The authors suggested that for VH, a contralesional stimulus on its own 
is not sufficiently strong to activate the response mechanisms required for overt 
detection and identification.  When these same response mechanisms are activated by 
the ipsilesional target, however, they are ‘primed’ for subsequent engagement.  In 
such a way, it is the primed response mechanisms that act to ‘pull out’ [sic.] a 
contralesional target that would otherwise be ignored.  This model suggests that task 
demands are crucial in whether or not an ipsilesional stimulus is detected in the 
presence of a contralesional one.  VH showed reliable anti-extinction when 
performing a simple detection task in both fields and also when performing an 
identification task in both fields, but not when he was asked to detect the stimulus in 
one field and identify the stimulus in the other field.  According to the authors, if 
common task requirements are shared (i.e. either to detect or identify both stimuli), 
then a priming benefit will emerge.  Indeed, the authors suggest that extinction 
studies of unilateral parietal patients which, traditionally, use the same task in both 
fields would find more pronounced extinction if different tasks (e.g. identification of 
one stimulus and detection of the other) were used. 
Humphreys et al. (2002) reported a study that investigated anti-extinction in a 
patient, GK, with bilateral parietal lesions and a strong spatial bias with more 
impaired identification of left visual field stimuli.  A series of experiments examined 
a number of factors that may have led to anti-extinction including temporal onset and 
offset of stimuli, response priming (as was suggested by Goodrich & Ward, 1997), 
eye movements, stimulus masking and temporal binding.  GK showed reliable anti-
extinction when stimuli were presented briefly (for less than 450 msec.) but when 
stimuli were presented for longer durations (between 450 and 900 msec.) the pattern 
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changed to one of extinction.  The authors suggested that this pattern is consistent 
with a temporal binding model: when stimuli remain on screen for relatively long 
durations GK’s spatial bias dictated that he selected the stimulus on the right before 
the one on the left, resulting in extinction.  However, when stimuli were presented 
relatively briefly, with common onsets, they were bound by temporal synchronization 
and both were selected. 
Since the two studies discussed here both reported single cases of brain 
damaged patients it is difficult to extrapolate any firm conclusions from their 
evidence.  It may be that what holds as an explanation in patient VH might not be 
applicable to GK, who had a number of different neurological complications.  
Nevertheless, it is still valuable to consider their explanations in relation to the current 
findings with non-brain damaged participants.  The suggestion that anti-extinction is 
dependent on response priming and occurs when the task requirements are the same 
for both stimuli (either detection or identification), but is mediated when the task 
requirements are different would support the findings of the current experiment in 
which the task was always one of identification.  The notion that it is transient 
temporal binding in brief exposure that accounts for the anti-extinction effect would 
be harder to reconcile with the current findings.  Since no temporal binding is likely 
to have occurred in the current experiment (exposure durations were the same as in 
Experiments 1 and 2 where this effect was not found), an alternative explanation 
based on the relative strength/weakness of stimuli is possible.  The studies reported in 
this thesis thus far have relied upon manipulating the relative strength of stimuli in 
order to simulate in healthy participants the condition in which an ipsilesional 
stimulus is far more salient than a concurrent contralesional one in patients with 
extinction.  Experiments 1, 2 and 3 achieved this by weakening the relative luminance 
of stimuli, thus attention was directed towards the stronger (brighter) stimulus in a 
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bottom-up manner.  However since identification requires retrieval of semantic 
information of stimuli and then previous exposure to similar targets, it might be that 
identification of stimuli relies more on top-down mechanisms than does detection.  
Accordingly, a further experiments was devised which relied on manipulation of 
stimulus strength in a top-down manner and this is reported in Chapter 3. 
Finally, in addressing the question of any possible bias towards one or other 
visual field in the current experiment, performance in identifying dim stimuli 
(regardless of whether they appeared alone or were accompanied by a bright stimulus 
in the opposite visual field) was slightly worse in the left visual field than the right, 
but this difference failed to reach statistical significance. 
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2.3   Summary and General Discussion 
 
Using a bottom-up paradigm, Experiments 1, 2 and 3 sought to reproduce an 
extinction-like pattern of errors in healthy volunteers by presenting stimuli of 
different conspicuity.  Stimulus salience was manipulated in all three experiments, 
thus inducing visual impoverishment.  In Experiment 1 accuracy rates showed that 
performance in bright unilateral trials was at ceiling, and few errors were made in dim 
unilateral trials.  On bilateral trials the bright stimuli were perceived whilst the dim 
stimuli were missed, consequently an extinction pattern of errors was reliably 
simulated.  A secondary aim of the experiment was to determine whether there was 
any evidence of an attentional bias towards one side of space, in line with some 
studies reported in the literature.  No such effect was found, but it was thought that 
accuracy may be too rough a measure to detect it.  Experiment 2 explored further the 
possibility of a difference in response times.  More errors were still made in bilateral 
than in unilateral dim displays, lending support to the notion of a competition effect 
but no difference in response times was found between left and right visual fields, nor 
was there a difference in response times between left and right hand responses. 
Interestingly, some cost of competition was also found for the ‘stronger' stimulus 
when presented with a weak extinguished one. However detection relies on very early 
visual processing mechanism, in which features are encoded in parallel. Experiment 3 
therefore investigated competition of visual attention with the more demanding task 
of identification of features where attentional selection is deployed and features are 
encoded serially (Treisman & Gelade, 1980; Broadbent & Broadbent, 1987). Results 
from Experiment 3 revealed an unexpected pattern of responses, in which accuracy 
for a weak stimulus was improved when it was accompanied by a strong stimulus, 
compared with when it appeared alone.  This was consistent with the notion of ‘anti-
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extinction’ as reported by Goodrich and Ward (1997) and Humphreys et al. (2002) in 
studies carried out with brain damaged patients.  The finding of anti-extinction in 
Experiment 3 may have been a result of the identification task used in that study.  For 
example, perhaps identification requires different processes that include more top-
down elements.  It is interesting to note that the only two reported cases of anti-
extinction (Goodrich and Ward, 1997 and Humphreys et al., 2002) reported 
experimental tasks that relied on identification tasks. 
In light of these considerations, the next phase of this series of studies used a 
top-down paradigm to investigate the primary research question of whether an 
extinction-like pattern of responses can be induced in healthy volunteers, and whether 
the finding of anti-extinction would be reproduced using a task that directs attention 
in a top-down manner.   
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Chapter 3                                           
Extinction and anti-extinction in healthy 
volunteers using a top-down paradigm 
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  Thus far, this thesis has investigated the effects on attention by manipulating 
the luminance of stimuli using a bottom-up paradigm observing an extinction-like 
pattern of errors with detection tasks and anti-extinction pattern of errors when 
identification of stimuli was required. Changing the task from one of simple detection 
to one of identification may have invoked retrieval of semantic information about a 
stimulus and may have guided attention distribution in a qualitative different way. 
The added complexity of the identification task may have enlisted some top-down 
cortical processes in addition to bottom-up mechanisms modulated by strength of 
stimuli. 
There is evidence in the literature that attention in extinction patients may be 
biased towards ipsilesional space not only by bottom-up factors, but also by top-down 
factors.  Vuilleumier and Rafal (2000), for example, investigated mechanisms of 
visual extinction by presenting patients with tasks in which they had to attend to the 
location, number and shape of stimuli presented in both visual fields.  They found 
marked contralesional extinction when the location had to be reported, but not when 
stimuli had to be enumerated.  Identifying distractors amongst shapes revealed an 
inability to detect two similar targets between and within hemifields.  It was 
concluded that spatial attention is not drawn to ipsilesional stimuli in a purely bottom-
up manner in extinction patients.  Kastner and Ungerleider (2000) published a review 
of mechanisms of visual attention.  Drawing on the neglect literature (e.g. Driver, 
Baylis & Rafal, 1992; Marshall & Halligan, 1994; Mattingley, Davis & Driver, 1997) 
they noted that the competition between multiple stimuli can be biased equally across 
the visual field by bottom-up processes; top-down mechanisms, on the other hand 
(e.g. directing attention towards a particular location) are biased towards the intact 
hemifield. 
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Covert attentional orienting has been the subject of much research.  As long 
ago as 1894, von Helmholtz observed from a series of experiments that “by a 
voluntary kind of intention, even without eye movements, and without changes of 
accommodation, one can concentrate attention on the sensation from a particular part 
of our peripheral nervous system and at the same time exclude attention from all other 
parts”.  Posner’s spotlight metaphor (1980) likened visual attention to a spotlight that 
facilitates detection of events within its beam.  Posner, Snyder and Davidson (1980) 
developed an endogenous cueing paradigm in which a central cue is presented at 
fixation and indicates whether the target will appear on the left or the right.  A 
peripheral stimulus item is then presented tachiscopically in either the left or right 
visual field and on control trials no cue is given.  This endogenous (controlled by the 
observer) approach is distinct from exogenous cueing, which relies on a change in the 
visual environment which will capture attention, for example, a flicker or occlusion 
that signals the appearance of a target stimulus.  There is no doubt that endogenous 
cueing effectively facilitates detection of the item and discrimination of its properties 
(Lupiáñez et al., 2004) and this method has been used extensively (e.g. Müller & 
Rabbitt, 1989; Theeuwes, 1994; Abrams & Dobkin, 1994; Caputo & Guerra, 1998) 
but not in an extinction paradigm.  The predictive value of the cue results in increased 
performance for targets at the cued location than for targets at uncued locations and is 
therefore a suitable paradigm for manipulating attention towards one visual field and 
away from another. 
Previous studies have, as a rule, employed endogenous cueing to orient 
attention towards a unilateral object in a simple detection task in which the stimulus 
item has been a shape or a flash of light.  In an extinction paradigm, however, there 
must be a bilateral condition in which two items appear concurrently.  Experiment 4 
will eliminate the bottom-up component led by the difference on stimuli strength  and 
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employ a top-down attentional cueing paradigm, in which stimuli of equal strength 
are cued by an arrow, in order to investigate whether anti-extinction effect could be 
reproduced and extended using a cued attention paradigm that engages top-down 
attentional mechanisms. 
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3.1. Experiment 4 
 
Thus far, this thesis has investigated the effects on attention of manipulating 
the strength of stimuli using a bottom-up paradigm in which the luminance of stimuli 
varied.  Bottom-up processing may cause our visual attention to be ‘pulled’ towards 
one object at the expense of another. Alternatively, top-down factors can ‘push’ our 
attention towards a particular object regardless of its physical properties. The analogy 
of the strong/weak stimuli from Experiments 1, 2 and 3 becomes a question of 
whether the stimulus is validly or invalidly cued in a top-down paradigm.  
In Experiment 4 the cue was an arrow that pointed either left or right and of 
particular interest was whether or not the anti-extinction effect seen in a bottom-up 
identification task (Experiment 3) would emerge in a top-down identification task. 
 
 
Method 
Participants 
The same twenty right-handed participants who took part in Experiment 3 
were recruited for this experiment.  
 
Apparatus 
The apparatus was the same as reported in Experiment 3. 
 
Stimuli 
 Stimuli were similar to those used in Experiment 3, however in Experiment 4 
all stimuli were dim (i.e., luminance for all shapes was fixed at 181), which 
correspond to the dim condition for Experiment 3. A black horizontal arrow (60*40 
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pixels) pointing left or right appeared in the centre of the screen. There was a 
randomized delay of 1000-2500 ms between each cue and display. All displays lasted 
for a fixed duration that was based upon individual performance on the titration 
conducted.  In Experiment 4 there were 126 individual trials (see Table 3.1.1). Valid 
and invalid cued stimuli were defined by whether or not a stimulus was correctly cued 
by the central arrow. 
 
Table 3.1.1: Stimulus displays 
Number of targets Left Right 
Unilateral (18) Valid   
Unilateral (9) Invalid   
Unilateral (18)  Valid 
Unilateral (9)  Invalid 
Bilateral (36) Valid Invalid 
Bilateral (36) Invalid Valid 
 
 Circle, square and triangle targets each appeared on the left in 50% of the trials and 
on the right in 50%. A higher number of valid unilateral trials vs. invalid unilateral 
trials was necessary in order for the arrow cue to be effective. For this reason, the 
arrow cue was valid in 67% of unilateral trials and invalid in 33% of unilateral trials.  
 
Procedure 
The procedure consisted of a short titration task (identical to that employed in 
Experiments 1, 2 and 3), followed by the experimental phase (see below). No 
feedback was given during the testing session. 
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Experimental Session 
Participants read a set of instructions presented on the screen.  They were 
asked to maintain fixation on the centre of the screen where the arrow would appear 
and to identify shapes appearing on one or both sides; examples of the three shapes 
were displayed.  Participants were informed that a shape was more likely (67% of the 
time) to appear on the side where the arrow was pointing, i.e. the cued side. A short 
practice block of twenty trials followed, in which every trial displayed a unilateral 
validly cued shape.  Immediately after each presentation participants were required to 
make a verbal response indicating the identity and location of the shape or shapes 
seen.  Responses were recorded on a keyboard by the experimenter, with specific 
keys assigned to each of the shapes and locations.  Keys ‘A’, ‘S’ and ‘D’ indicated 
responses to shapes on the left and ‘J’, ‘K’ and ‘L’ to shapes on the right.  In cases 
where participants did not perceive anything on a particular side of space they were 
instructed to say the word “nothing”, in which case the experimenter would press the 
spacebar.  If they perceived something but could not identify the shape explicitly, 
they were instructed to say “I don’t know”, and the experimenter would press ‘E’ 
(left) or ‘U’ (right).  In this way, a response was always recorded for left and right.  
Half of the participants reported the left target first and the other half followed the 
opposite order. There was no time limit and participants were advised to take as long 
as necessary and focus on accuracy.  Participants were offered a short break after 
approximately every 50 trials.  No feedback was given during the test sessions. 
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Results 
 
One participant’s overall score (<20%) was far below the overall group mean 
so it was excluded from further analysis.  
Percentage of error responses was higher for invalid than valid targets.  Figure 
3.1.1 shows percentage of error responses for each individual condition. Moreover, 
invalid targets were better reported in bilateral than in unilateral trials.  
 
  
 
Figure 3.1.1: Mean (%) errors and standard errors in all conditions 
 
 
An omnibus ANOVA analysed side (left/right) x condition 
(unilateral/bilateral) x cue (valid/invalid) x order of report (left/right). ANOVA 
revealed a main effect for cue F (1, 17) = 11.29, p <.01, of condition  F (1, 17) = 
7.28, p <.05, but side and order of report were not significant.  There was a significant 
interaction between the cue and condition F (1, 17) = 5.53, p <.05. Post-hoc pairwise 
comparisons mainly revealed that invalid targets were significantly better identified in 
bilateral than in unilateral condition t (18) = -2.9, p=.009 (See Figure 3.1.2). 
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Figure 3.1.2:  Mean (%) errors and standard errors of invalid targets in unilateral and bilateral 
conditions 
 
 
 
Discussion 
There was still no significant effect of laterality but the ‘anti-extinction’ 
pattern of errors was observed; if an invalid target was presented on its own, there 
was less chance of it being identified than when it was presented bilaterally beside a 
valid target.  Thus, an anti-extinction effect was observed when the task was one of 
identification.  
This effect, found in Experiments 3 and 4, is difficult to explain since it has 
never before been reported in a non-clinical sample.  One can only make an analogy 
between the contralesional stimulus in patients and the less salient, or weaker, 
stimulus in the current studies, that is the dim stimulus in Experiment 3 and the 
invalid stimulus in the current experiment.  Similarly, or course, the ipsilesional 
stimulus for patients may be seen as the stronger of the two stimuli here, i.e. the 
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bright, or validly cued, stimulus.  The explanations proposed by Goodrich and Ward 
(1997) and Humphreys et al. (2002) to account for anti-extinction would, perhaps, be 
best applied to clinical participants with contralesional and ipsilesional visual fields 
and, as such, cannot fully explain the results herein.  It may be that whether extinction 
or anti-extinction emerges depends not just on temporal binding (as suggested by 
Humphreys et al., 2001) but on an imbalanced competition between stimuli that is 
determined by the relative strength of stimulus in the left and right visual fields.   
In the current study’s invalid unilateral conditions, attention was directed by 
the cue towards an empty space.  Meanwhile, the stimulus in the other field remains 
unattended while the participant waits for a target that never arrives.  By the time 
attention is disengaged, the display has disappeared and no stimulus is detected.  
However, in bilateral trials there is no ‘waiting’: two targets appear, the cued one is 
perceived and reported immediately, leaving time for the uncued side of space to be 
scanned and reported.  Thus it may be that the relative strength and weakness of 
stimuli is important in understanding anti-extinction (at least in healthy individuals), 
perhaps more so than task requirements. 
It would be of interest to carry out further studies to test this assumption as 
well as the temporal binding account.  Humphreys et al. (2002) reported that their 
patient GK’s pattern of errors changed from anti-extinction to extinction when 
stimulus durations were lengthened to more than 450 msec.  In healthy volunteers, 
longer exposure durations would likely result in a ceiling effect in all conditions, so in 
order for this finding to be supported or refuted it is necessary to test extinction 
patients.  Thus far, other than the studies by Goodrich and Ward (1997) and 
Humphreys et al. (2002), the incidence of anti-extinction in brain damaged patients is 
unknown since it may have gone unreported.  It remains to be discovered, therefore, 
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how commonly extinction and anti-extinction co-occur in patients and under what 
conditions each of the two phenomena occur. 
Chapter 4 describes a series of experiments with extinction patients that 
partially replicated Humphreys et al.’s first experiment. 
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Chapter 4                                            
Extinction and anti-extinction in  
brain damaged patients 
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4.1  Assessment of extinction in 9 brain damaged 
patients 
 
Anti-extinction is a rarely reported phenomenon that is surprising because it 
seems to contradict theories of normal attentional function in which attention is 
considered to be of limited capacity.  Performance declines when two stimuli are 
attended relative to one (Broadbent, 1958; Duncan, 1980; Treisman, 1969) and the 
‘stronger’ stimulus receives more attention at the expenses of the ‘weaker’ one. 
However, anti-extinction may have been underestimated for methodological issues, 
and it may be more common than is reported; there may be an assumption by 
researchers that patients with right hemisphere damage who show poor report of 
single contralesional stimuli would perform worse still in double stimulation trials. In 
such cases performance on double stimulus trials may not be examined and cases of 
anti-extinction may go unreported. Di Pellegrino, Basso and Frassinetti (1997), for 
example, reported a patient with right parietal damage who showed a marked 
impairment in processing a single stimulus (when it occurred within a period of 
several hundred milliseconds before or after the onset of an ipsilesional one).  Olson, 
Stark and Chatterjee (2003) described a patient with right parietal damage whose 
ability to discriminate items in contralesional (as well as ipsilesional) space was 
marginally better with than without competing items.  In a study by Baylis, Driver 
and Rafal (1993), five extinction patients were reported to display more pronounced 
extinction when stimuli shared the same dimension (colour or shape).  The authors 
present a table of raw data that clearly shows this to be the case; however, it can also 
be noted from their data that all five patients showed poorer performance on single 
left trials than on left stimuli in double trials in either or both dimensions 
(colour/shape). Whilst differences were small and may not reach statistical 
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significance, there is a clear and unequivocal trend that has gone unreported, 
seemingly because the authors were addressing the question of the differences in 
errors between the two dimensions. To date, only two studies in the literature have 
clearly referred to this pattern of data as anti-extinction and the authors have offered a 
number of suggestions to explain the phenomenon; both of these studies will be 
described here and discussed in relation to the findings here of anti-extinction in 
healthy volunteers. 
 Goodrich and Ward (1997) were surprised to find that their patient, VH, 
showed better performance on detection of contralesional stimuli when they were 
accompanied by ipsilesional stimuli than when they were presented alone.  Over ten 
sessions, VH participated in a number of computerised tasks involving the detection 
and identification of stimuli in which the features of the target items were 
manipulated to test a number of hypotheses concerning the anti-extinction effect.  In 
all sessions there were four display types: Single Left, Single Right, Double and 
Blank displays and the participant responded verbally by indicating “left”, “right”, 
“both” or “nothing”.  As is standard in tasks for extinction patients, central fixation 
was maintained by means of a fixation point in the centre of the screen, which 
appeared briefly and was followed by stimulus displays.  In all of the experiments 
reported by Goodrich and Ward (1997), stimuli appeared for less than 50 msec  
Stimuli in the first two sessions consisted of letters ‘X’ and ‘O’ and a reliable pattern 
of anti-extinction emerged.  In the following session, the letter stimuli were replaced 
with circles and triangles and the same pattern of errors was observed.  Next, drawing 
on previous research that showed ‘good’ objects are less likely than ‘scrambled’ 
objects to be extinguished (Ward & Goodrich, 1996), simple line drawings of 
common items (e.g. a house, heart, pipe, envelope, cup, crocodile, newt, camel) that 
were either complete or ‘scrambled’ by fragmenting the outlines and scattering them 
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randomly within the outlines of the original pictures, were presented.  It seemed to be 
the case that, for VH, contralesional items benefited from the simultaneous 
appearance of ipsilesional ones and it was speculated that if ‘good’ contralesional 
items are less likely than scrambled ones to be extinguished, then maybe, in the case 
of VH, good contralesional items might benefit less from ipsilesional stimuli, 
eradicating the anti-extinction effect.  This was not the case and VH continued to 
show a significant anti-extinction pattern of errors. Following the finding by Ward et 
al. (1994) that perceptual grouping reduces extinction (described briefly here in 
Section 1.3.2), two further sessions explored the effect of grouped versus ungrouped 
stimuli.  It was thought that since a contralesional stimulus is less likely to be 
extinguished when it is perceptually grouped with an ipsilesional one than when the 
two items do not form a perceptual group, then grouping may actually improve 
detection of contralesional items in bilateral conditions.  Indeed, Goodrich and Ward 
(1997) conjectured that anti-extinction could be an extreme form of this perceptual 
grouping benefit.  This would seem a reasonable supposition; it might be that, if there 
were good perceptual grouping between two simultaneously presented stimuli, then 
the anti-extinction effect could be even more evident in the case of VH. However, the 
grouping or non-grouping of stimuli was found to have no effect; a large anti-
extinction effect was still found, but there was no significant effect of perceptual 
grouping.  In two subsequent testing sessions the horizontal alignment of the stimuli 
was manipulated.  The letter X was presented either in horizontal alignment or above 
or below fixation, creating a diagonal alignment, with the speculation that the spatial 
relationship between the two simultaneous items could be the basis of VH’s anti-
extinction; perhaps when the stimuli were presented in line with one another the 
presence of an ipsilesional item could serve as a cue to the contralesional item, and if 
this spatial symmetry were disrupted then anti-extinction might not occur.  Two 
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possible outcomes were anticipated: either the trials in which the stimuli were 
horizontally aligned would result in higher detection of contralesional stimuli, or 
(since aligned and non-aligned stimuli were randomly presented in a block), reducing 
the predictability of the spatial relationship would disrupt the effect of alignment and 
eliminate the anti-extinction effect across all conditions.  It was found, however, that 
neither of these predictions held true; anti-extinction was slightly reduced but not 
eliminated, and still statistically significant in all conditions and there was no effect of 
the alignment of the items. The alignment of stimuli, though diagonal and not 
horizontal, was still symmetrical so, in a final session, stimuli were presented in 
random asymmetrical spatial arrays on the left or right of the screen.  Eliminating the 
remaining spatial predictability still did not eliminate the anti-extinction effect, and it 
was concluded that the spatial arrangement of items was not an important factor in 
VH’s anti-extinction.  A second set of studies reported by Goodrich and Ward (1997) 
showed that, in the case of VH, anti-extinction was dependent on the types of tasks 
performed and on whether or not the same task was performed in both visual fields.  
In the studies described thus far, the task always consisted of detection of stimuli.  
For the subsequent two testing sessions the task requirement was varied so that VH 
was asked to identify both targets in double simultaneous presentation (‘Same Task’) 
or to identify the contralesional target and simply to detect the ipsilesional one 
(‘Different Task’).  In the ‘Same Task’, VH continued to show anti-extinction, even 
though the task was perceptually different (one of identification, rather than 
detection).  In the ‘Different Task’ however, the presence or absence of an 
ipsilesional item had no significant effect on identification of a contralesional one, 
thus the anti-extinction effect was negated.  In these ‘Different Task’ conditions VH 
correctly identified 45% of contralesional items in double displays and 39% of 
contralesional items in single displays, so it cannot be said that he displayed the 
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opposite pattern of extinction, merely that significant anti-extinction was no longer 
found.  It should be noted, however, that this pattern of errors still resembles one of 
anti-extinction (i.e. better report of contralesional items in double displays than in 
single displays) and, although the difference failed to reach significance it can still be 
considered a trend towards significance.  It seemed that, for VH, anti-extinction was 
influenced by the influence of ipsilesional processing on contralesional identification.  
The authors suggested that their findings might be generalised to other right 
hemisphere-damaged patients; since previous extinction studies had always used the 
same task in both fields they may have missed important differences in the extinction 
effect that would become apparent if different tasks were used.  It was speculated that 
if patients were to be tested in both Same and Different tasks, extinction would be 
more pronounced in the latter.  Goodrich and Ward (1997) put forward a number of 
possible explanations for their findings.  The results could not be attributed to general 
visual processing capacity limitations, since stimulus identification places a higher 
demand on processing performance than does detection – resource limitations alone 
would predict poorer performance in the Same Task (in which identification of both 
stimuli was required) than the Different Task (in which only one stimulus had to be 
identified and the other simply detected).  Nor could the results be due to the 
cognitive effort of switching tasks, which are known to reduce performance (Allport, 
Styles, & Hsieh, 1994), because this would not account for the improved 
contralesional performance on Double compared to Single left displays.  The authors 
suggested that the presence of a contralesional stimulus alone is insufficient to trigger 
appropriate response mechanisms (i.e. the mechanisms necessary for detection and 
identification) in VH, but when these mechanisms are activated by the ipsilesional 
stimulus they are primed for subsequent engagement by the less salient contralesional 
stimulus.  In other words, the presence of an ipsilesional item primes a response to the 
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contralesional item, and this response priming benefit occurs when the contra- and 
ipsilesional tasks are the same, and not different, and when the same response 
mechanisms are shared. They refer to the contralesional stimulus, which might 
otherwise be ignored, being ‘pulled out’ by the primed task-specific response 
mechanism.   
Humphreys et al. (2002) reported six experiments conducted on GK, a patient 
with bilateral parietal lesions following two strokes, but who exhibited a strong 
rightward spatial bias, showing neglect on a number of clinical tasks.  It should be 
noted that GK also had a number of additional neurological symptoms, including 
Balint’s syndrome (incoordination of hand and eye movement and the inability to 
perceive more than one object at a time; Cooper & Humphreys, 2000; Humphreys, 
Romani, Olson, Riddoch & Duncan, 1994)  and attentional dyslexia (Hall, 
Humphreys & Cooper, 2001).  Experiment 1 examined the time course of extinction 
and anti-extinction effects by varying the exposure duration of stimuli in a task in 
which GK was required to identify letters (A, B, C or D) that appeared randomly to 
the left or right of central fixation, and were displayed either unilaterally or bilaterally 
with some blank trials included.  The letters appeared for seven different stimulus 
durations (75, 150, 450, 600, 750 and 900 msec), randomly displayed in six blocks of 
trials.  GK showed clear anti-extinction on trials with brief exposures (up to 300 
msec) however, as the stimulus duration increased, then the pattern of anti-extinction 
changed to one of extinction.  With regard to the findings of Goodrich and Ward 
(1997), this change from extinction to anti-extinction at longer stimulus durations was 
not explored; patient VH showed consistent anti-extinction in a variety of tests, but 
one variable that was not manipulated by Goodrich and Ward was the duration for 
which stimuli were displayed.  Their stimulus durations were all less than 50 msec 
and, whilst they did find that the anti-extinction effect was modulated when task 
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demands differed between contra- and ipsilesional items, it would be interesting to 
know whether VH might have shown extinction at longer stimulus durations.  Since 
studies have shown that, in normal observers,  abrupt onsets in visual displays can be 
strong cues for the capture of visual attention (Yantis, 1998; Yantis & Jonides, 1984; 
1990), Humphreys et al. (2002) examined the effects of onsets by presenting the 
stimuli as offsets rather than onsets (by initially presenting masks, which disappeared 
from the screen to reveal stimuli (Experiment 2a) and by having the stimuli onset 
abruptly, but following them with masks designed to that the stimuli did not offset 
(Experiment 2b). The latter task was one of detection, rather than identification, 
because the post-display masks that were used made performance more difficult.  
Interestingly, in Experiment 2a the anti-extinction effect was not found at shorter 
durations, as in the previous experiment, rather an extinction effect was observed at 
longer stimulus durations (450 msec and over).  In Experiment 2b anti-extinction was 
found, but only for shorter durations as in Experiment 1.  Thus so far anti-extinction 
had been found for brief stimulus durations both in identification task (Experiment 1) 
and a detection task (Experiment 2b).  Since the effect had been observed when target 
letters onset but do not offset together, it was concluded that common offsets are not 
necessary for anti-extinction.  In contrast, Experiment 2a showed that there was no 
anti-extinction effect when stimuli were defined by offsets, suggesting that common 
onsets are crucial.  This factor had not been considered by Goodrich and Ward 
(1997), who instead explained anti-extinction as the result of response priming: report 
of contralesional items was supported by the same response being made to 
ipsilesional items. To test this in Experiment 3a GK was asked to identify both letters 
on some double stimulation trials and to identify the letter on the contralesional side 
but simply detect the letter on the ipsilesional side in others.  Similarly, Experiment 
3b was identical to Experiment 3a, except that on double stimulation trials the letters 
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were the same (00 or XX) on half the trials and different (OX or XO) on the others.  
According to the response-priming account suggested by Goodrich and Ward (2002), 
anti-extinction should occur when the letters were the same, but not when they were 
different because for response priming to occur, the responses to both stimuli must be 
the same.  Anti-extinction was found both in Experiments 3A and 3B, but in all 
conditions so this could not be attributed to response-priming.  Another factor that 
Humphreys et al. considered might be important in inducing anti-extinction was 
whether GK’s unusual pattern of anti-extinction at brief exposures and extinction at 
longer ones might be due to eye movements in longer exposure durations.  If, for 
example, GK moved his eyes in an ipsilateral direction during longer stimulus 
displays this could cause him to miss the contralesional stimulus, resulting in 
extinction.  To test this, GK’s eye movements were monitored in Experiment 4 in 
which the method was identical to Experiment 1.  The anti-extinction effect prevailed 
even when eye movements were made towards ipsilesional space, showing that the 
change in the error pattern from anti-extinction to extinction was not due to eye 
movements in longer stimulus exposure trials.  Thus far, anti-extinction had been 
found in response to brief stimuli when stimuli in both fields onset together and three 
possible explanations were considered: a) cueing attention to a common spatial region 
as suggested by Goodrich and Ward (1997); b) increased arousal (which could occur 
when more than one stimulus appears and the observer tries to pay more attention to 
all stimuli that are present, possibly resulting in the anti-extinction effect in GK’s 
case) and c) temporal binding of the stimuli (which could explain the fact that anti-
extinction occurred for brief stimuli but the pattern changed to one of extinction when 
the stimuli remained for longer in the visual field).  These three possibilities were 
tested in Humphries et al.’s Experiments 5a and 5b, in which a central masked offset 
letter appeared, flanked on either side by two similar masked onset letters.  In two 
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blocks the onset letters were red and the offset letters and pre-masks were in black, to 
highlight grouping differences between the onset and offset items.  In another two 
blocks the onset and offset letters were all black.  In Experiment 5a, GK was asked to 
report all the letters.  If the cueing account held true, then GK would be expected to 
perform well in reporting the central letter on trials where he first reported a left-side 
letter created by an onset because the central letter should be selected before the 
leftward one since it falls relatively to the right, within the attended area of space; the 
more ipsilesional of the two stimuli (the central one) should prime a response to the 
contralesional one.  The arousal account would predict that GK would be able to 
report all three stimuli; furthermore, that report of the central letter on trials with two 
onsets should be better than on trials with one onset.  Finally, the binding account 
would predict accurate report of the left and right items, but not necessarily of the 
central item since the central letter was created by an offset rather than an onset.  It 
was found that GK was able to identify the central letter on all one-item trials in 
which the left letter was also identified, the central letter being selected first.  In 
contrast, he performed poorly in identifying the central offset letter on two-item trials 
even when the left offset letter was identified.  These findings are consistent with the 
binding account and not the attentional cueing or arousal accounts.  According to this 
account the left and right stimuli are grouped by common onset, resulting in an anti-
extinction effect.  This would appear to account for GK’s responses; his spatial bias 
dictated that the rightmost stimulus was selected first and this was grouped by 
common onset with the leftmost stimulus, which was reported prior to the central 
offset letter.  This pattern of responses might partly  be explained by the fact that 
stimulus onsets are more salient than offsets (Yantis, 1998) but one would expect this 
to affect GK’s responses to all onset stimuli, and this was not the case.  Since, on one-
item trials, central offset letters were identified prior to left onset letters it was 
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speculated that a single left onset may not generate a strong enough masking effect, 
enabling selection of the central letter prior to the left flanker.  To test this, 
Experiment 5b required GK to report only the central letter, which was presented in a 
different colour to the flanking onset letters.  If poor report of the central letter was 
because GK selected the two flankers, then the effect should have been mediated in 
this experiment.  Data showed better report of the central letter here than when 
flanker letters had to be reported, suggesting that poor report of the central item in 
two-item displays of Experiment 5a was not due to lateral masking.  As a result of 
Experiments 1 – 5b it was concluded that GK’s anti-extinction was due to temporal 
binding based on common (and simultaneous) onset of the stimuli.  A final 
experiment was run to explore GK’s reaction to stimuli that did not occur 
simultaneously.  One red and one green letter were presented on each trial and GK 
was required to judge which colour appeared first.  The letters were presented either 
simultaneously or separated in time by 450 msec or 720 msec  An anti-extinction 
effect was found when the letters were presented simultaneously.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                        
However, when they were staggered in time GK consistently judged that the right 
item appeared prior to the left.  It was concluded that the effects of time on anti-
extinction dissociated from the effects on conscious temporal order judgment.  In 
summary, the authors suggested that for GK anti-extinction occurred when stimuli 
that have a common onset are briefly presented, and that the effect is due to temporal 
binding of the stimuli.  This is interpreted as indicating that there is unconscious and 
transient temporal binding in vision. 
The diverse explanations offered by Goodrich and Ward (1997) and 
Humphreys et al. (2002) to account for anti-extinction do share the notion that report 
of a contralesional stimulus is triggered by report of an ipsilesional stimulus; by 
response priming according to the former authors, and by temporal binding by the 
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latter.  A new explanation is suggested for the findings in the current experiments that 
also share this underlying assumption, though with yet another interpretation.  It is 
proposed that the right- or left bias, induced by bottom-up or top-down mechanisms 
found in healthy participants, dictates that the right, or left, visual field is attended 
initially, and that If no stimulus appears in the firstly attended visual field, attention 
remains there ‘waiting’ for its appearance.  If, however, a stimulus does appear there, 
then the stimulus is promptly processed, freeing attentional resources to shift to the 
other visual field, where a second stimulus may occur and be processed.  This account 
depends on the relative strength of stimuli in both fields and would explain anti-
extinction both in patients and healthy individuals.  In patients with right hemisphere 
damage, attention is drawn strongly towards ipsilesional space, thus the ipsilesional 
(right) stimulus is accorded more strength than the weaker contralesional one.  Thus, 
report of the stronger ipsilesional item may trigger report of the weaker contralesional 
one by freeing attentional resources to shift to the more poorly attended contralesional 
space.   
 The dearth of reporting of anti-extinction in the literature does not necessarily 
indicate its rarity. Indeed, it may be possible that anti-extinction has passed unnoticed 
as poor performance in reporting single contralesional items is interpreted as evidence 
of hemianopia thus rendering assessment with double presentation simply irrelevant. 
However, findings with healthy volunteers in Experiments 3 and 4 of this thesis and 
evidence from Goodrich and Ward (1997) and Humphreys et al. (2002) patients 
suggested that better performance with double trials may be observed if specifically 
investigated, for example increasing duration of stimuli presentation. Since, it would 
not be possible to present stimuli for very long durations (e.g. > 450 ms, as reported 
by Humphreys et al., 2002) to healthy volunteers without a resulting ceiling effect, a 
sample of brain damaged patients was sought.   
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Method 
Participants 
 The University of Waterloo in Ontario, Canada maintains a database of brain 
damaged patients who have indicated that they are willing to take part in research
2
 
and nine of these patients were selected for participation in the experiments reported 
here.  The study received institutional ethics approval from both Goldsmiths and 
Waterloo Universities and all nine patients gave informed consent to participate. 
 Initial assessment of extinction is reported in these patients.  Nine right 
handed adult patients with right hemisphere vascular lesions were recruited via the 
University of Waterloo’s Neurological Patient Database and gave informed consent to 
participate in this study.  Neglect was investigated by means of the Star Cancellation 
test (Albert, 1973), Bell Cancellation test (Gauthier, Dehaut, & Joanette, 1989), the 
Drawing task involving copying of three different simple figures (e.g., a flower; 
Wilson, Cockburn, & Halligan, 1987), and the Line Bisection test (Wilson et al., 
1987). For the Line Bisection test deviations from the true centre greater than 10% of 
line length were considered evidence of neglect. All but one of the patients had 
previously shown left neglect.  Demographic and clinical data, as well as neglect 
diagnosis for all nine patients are presented in Table 4.1.1.  All patients were well 
oriented in time and place and had good comprehension.  They were paid for their 
participation and signed informed consent statements. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
2
 The Neurological Patient Database is maintained under the direction of Dr James Danckert with the 
assistance of Project Co-ordinator Nadine Quehl.  Further information is available at 
http://npd.uwaterloo.ca/ 
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Table 4.1.1: Patients’ demographic and clinical data  
Patient Sex Age Months 
post 
infarct 
Demonstrated 
signs of 
neglect * 
Lesion nature and site 
HH F 47 11 Left neglect Nature: Ischaemic and 
heamorrhagic stroke. 
Site: Right frontal and 
parietal cortex/right middle 
cerebral artery/right internal 
carotid artery.   
 
WW M 63 1 Left neglect Nature : Ischaemic stroke. 
Site: Right temporal lobe 
cortical sulci. 
 
JJ M 72 16 Left neglect Nature: Subdural 
haematoma 
Site: Right frontoparietal 
cortex. 
 
CP M 60 5 Left neglect Nature:  Ischaemic stroke 
Site: Right fronto-parietal 
and occipital cortex and 
subcortical structures; 
corpus callosum and 
splenium 
 
RB M 62 2 Left neglect Nature: Ischaemic stroke. 
Site: Right parietal lobe, 
including subcortical 
structures. 
 
CS F 73 10 No neglect Nature: Ischaemic stroke. 
Site: Right parietal cortex.   
 
LG M 41 10 Left neglect Nature: Ischaemic and 
heamorrhagic stroke. 
Site: Right temporal and 
parietal cortex. 
 
OP M 56 4 Left neglect 
(figure 
drawing) 
Nature: Ischaemic stroke. 
Site: Right frontal and 
parietal cortex. 
 
DF M 80 4 Left neglect Nature: Ischaemic stroke. 
Site: Right parietal 
subcortical structures. 
 
* Neglect was established by a series of routine tests (i.e., Star and Bell Cancellation tests, copying of 
drawings and Line Bisection).  
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Visual extinction was assessed by means of two tests: first clinically with the 
Visual Confrontation Test (Bender, 1952), and then with a computer task. 
 
Visual Confrontation Test:  The examiner held both hands at shoulder height 
and moved two fingers of either the left, right or both hands simultaneously.  The 
patient’s task was to maintain central fixation (by looking at the examiner’s nose) and 
to report whether a stimulus (a movement of the fingers) was detected on their left, 
right, or on both sides.  Six unilateral left, six unilateral right and six bilateral stimuli 
were presented in random order.  According to Geeraerts, Lafosse, Vandenbussche 
and Verfaillie (2005), responses indicating detection of unilateral stimuli in both 
fields (at least 80%), but failure to detect a stimulus in the patient’s contralesional 
field in bilateral trials (more than 30%) would indicate extinction.   
 
Computer Task:  Following Cocchini, Cubelli, Della Sala and Beschin’s 
(1999) procedure, a computerised test (described below) was devised to assess 
patients’ ability to detect stimuli presented very briefly.  The test also enabled 
accurate control of spatio-temporal parameters.   
 
Apparatus 
The computerised experiment was constructed using E-Prime software and 
run on a Dell Inspiron laptop computer with a 39.1 cm screen (31.29cm wide x 
23.47cm high) and a screen resolution of 1680 x 1050 pixels.  Participants were 
seated centrally in front of the laptop, which was placed on a table at a viewing 
distance of approximately 50 cm.  Thus, the visual angle subtended to the eye by the 
viewing area at this distance was approximately 34° horizontally and 26° vertically. 
 119 
An additional, external keyboard was connected to the laptop computer, enabling the 
experimenter (seated beside the patient) to make keyboard responses. 
 
Stimuli 
The stimuli are illustrated in Figure 4.1.1.  Stimuli were based on those used 
by Cocchini et al. (1999) in an assessment of visual extinction.  A white fixation 
cross, 1.15° high and wide, was displayed in the centre of the screen against a dark 
grey background, followed 150ms later by stimulus onset.  Stimulus items consisted 
of white dots 0.58° in diameter, presented for 100ms at about 14° from the point of 
fixation.  Stimuli appeared randomly, either unilaterally to the left or right of fixation, 
or bilaterally in both fields.  Precise luminance (cd/m
2
) and settings for the 
background and the stimuli are presented in Table 4.1.2. 
   
 
Figure 4.1.1: A schematic representation of an experimental trial.  In each trial, a central fixation 
cross appeared on the screen, followed after 150ms by a stimulus event (in this example stimuli appear 
in both left and right visual fields).  Stimuli remained on the screen for100msec   
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Table 4.1.2: Settings of Background and Stimuli  
 Luminance 
(cd/m
2
) 
Saturation Luminance Red Green Blue 
Background .15 0 53 56 56 56 
Stimuli and 
Fixation 
Cross 
 
10.8 
 
0 
 
240 
 
255 
 
255 
 
255 
 
 
 
Procedure   
Eye movements were monitored by an assistant seated behind the computer 
screen.  The patient was aware that his/her eye movements were being monitored, and 
he/she was instructed to fixate centrally whenever an eye shift occurred.  If eye 
movements deviated from the centre of the screen on a trial, then that trial was 
excluded from the final analysis.  There were 32 trials (16 bilateral, 8 unilateral left 
and 8 unilateral right) presented in a randomised order.  Each trial began with the 
onset of the central fixation cross.  There followed a blank interval of 150ms and then 
the stimulus display.  Patients made verbal responses reporting how many dots (one 
or two) appeared, and on which side of the screen.  Keyboard responses were made 
by the experimenter and the entry of each response initiated the next trial.  
 
Results 
 
Visual Confrontation test 
Results for all nine patients of the visual confrontation test are presented in 
Table 4.1.3. 
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Table 4.1.3: Errors in identifying movements in clinical confrontation test 
3
 
Patient Single (unilateral) trials Double (bilateral) trials 
 Left Errors (%) Right Errors (%) Left Errors (%) Right Errors (%) 
CP 0 0 16 0 
HH 0 0 81.25 0 
WW 0 0 50.00 0 
JJ 0 0 0 0 
RB 0 0 0 0 
CS 0 0 0 0 
LG 0 0 0 0 
OP 0 0 31.25 0 
DF 0 0 0 0 
 
As can be seen from Table 4.1.3, all nine patients correctly detected all single 
stimuli (both left and right) and all stimuli in ipsilesional space in double trials.  If 
extinction were to take place, one would expect to see a high percentage of errors in 
the highlighted column for contralesional stimuli in double trials, and a low 
percentage of errors in single trial columns.  Previous studies employing this test (e.g. 
Geeraerts et al., 2005) have classified patients as showing extinction if they correctly 
detected more that 80% of unilateral left and right stimuli, but failed to perceive more 
than 30% of stimuli in bilateral trials.  According to these criteria, only three patients 
(HH, WW and OP) showed extinction, missing 81.25%, 50% and 31.25%, 
respectively of contralesional stimuli on double trials.   However, it was noted that 
OP found it difficult to maintain central fixation and was hesitant in making 
responses to the stimuli.  Patient CP showed a slight trend towards extinction, his 
only errors being on 16% of contralesional stimuli in double trials.   Five of the nine 
patients showed no extinction on the visual confrontation test, scoring at ceiling in all 
trials (Patients JJ, RB, CS, LG and DF).   
                                                 
3
 Errors are defined as trials on which no stimulus was reported 
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Computer Task 
Results of the computer task for all nine patients are presented in Table 4.1.4. 
 
Table 4.1.4: Errors in computerized detection task 
4
 
Patient Single (unilateral) trials Double (bilateral) trials 
 Left (% errors) Right (% errors) Left (% errors) Right (% errors) 
CP 62.50 0 0 0 
HH 12.50 12.50 81.25 0 
WW 0 0 100.00 0 
JJ 12.50 0 81.25 0 
RB 0 0 6.25 0 
CS 12.50 0 0 0 
LG 0 0 12.50 6.25 
OP 75.00 0 62.50 31.25 
DF 0 0 0 0 
 
As Table 4.1.3 shows, there was a more complex pattern of results than was 
found in the visual confrontation test.  Interestingly, patient CP showed anti-
extinction with a high error rate in left single trials and accuracy at ceiling in left 
double trials.  Following previous criterion by Geeraerts et al. (2005) for extinction, 
three patients (HH, WW and JJ) showed extinction with few errors in left single trials, 
and high percentages of errors in left double trials.  Patients RB, CS, LG and DF 
scored at or almost at ceiling in all conditions, whilst patient OP had poor accuracy in 
all conditions with left stimuli in line with a possible visual hemianopia.   
  Patient CP showed mild extinction on the visual confrontation test and anti-
extinction on the computerized test.  In order to explore whether an extinction pattern 
of errors would emerge with longer exposure durations (as was the case with 
Humphreys et al.’s patient GK), a number of further tests were devised for CP; these 
are described in Experiments 5 A and B. 
                                                 
4
 Errors are defined as trials on which no stimulus was reported 
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Patients HH, WW and JJ all showed reliable extinction either on the visual 
confrontation test, the computerised test, or both.  Further tests with these patients are 
described in Experiment 6. 
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4.2   Experiment 5A 
  
Patient CP showed a pattern of anti-extinction in the assessment tests 
described earlier so Experiment 5 was devised to explore these responses further in 
this patient, in particular to determine whether a pattern of extinction would emerge 
with longer stimulus durations in a simple detection task.  Stimulus durations were 
manipulated in a simple detection task similar to the preliminary task in which anti-
extinction had been observed in this patient.  
 
 
Method 
 
Participant 
Demographic and clinical data for Patient CP may be found in Table 4.1.1.  
Lesion sites had previously been identified by a computerised tomography (CT) scan, 
which is presented in Figure 4.2.1. 
 
 
Figure 4.2.1: MRI scans for Patient CP showing damage to the post right occipital region extending to 
the corpus callosum and the right fronto-parietal region.  Scans are in radiological convention, i.e. 
right hemisphere is represented on the left side of the image.   
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Apparatus 
Apparatus was identical to that reported in the previous experiment for the 
computerised test.  Testing took place in a room with no natural light; an overhead 
light with a constant brightness remained on for all testing sessions.   
 
Stimuli 
Stimuli were identical to those in the previous experiment for the 
computerised test, but were presented for four different durations (150, 300, 450 and 
600 msec) at about 5 degrees from point of fixation.  There were 33 trials for each 
stimulus duration, presented in a randomised order.  Stimuli appeared randomly, 
either unilaterally to the left or right of fixation, or bilaterally in both fields. 
 
Procedure   
Eye movements were monitored by an assistant seated behind the computer 
screen.  The patient was aware that his eye movements were being monitored, and he 
was instructed to fixate whenever an eye shift occurred.  If eye movements deviated 
from the centre of the screen that trial was excluded from the final analysis.  Each 
trial began with the onset of the central fixation cross.  There followed a blank 
interval of 150ms and then the stimulus display.  CP made verbal responses and 
keyboard responses were made by a second experimenter (the author).  The entry of 
each response initiated the next trial.  
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Results 
 
As can be seen, when exposure time of stimuli increased CP’s performance 
was at or almost at ceiling across all single left trials.  Data are presented in Table 
4.2.1. 
  
 
Table 4.2.1:  Mean errors in single left and double trials 
 
Stimulus 
Duration 
% Errors 
Single Left 
Trials 
% Left 
Errors in 
Double Trials 
p-value 
150 msec 
300 msec 
450 msec 
600 msec 
  7% 
  0 
  0 
  7% 
0 
0 
0 
0 
ns 
ns 
ns 
ns 
 
 
 
Discussion 
According to Humphreys et al. (2002), longer stimulus durations are more 
likely to result in an extinction, rather than an anti-extinction pattern of data, but CP’s 
anti-extinction did not reverse to extinction with longer stimulus durations, as he 
scored at ceiling in all conditions.  However, Humphreys et al. had used a paradigm 
of identification rather than one of simple detection. It was speculated that this 
difference in error patterns might become apparent in an identification task, either 
because it may be more sensitive, or because of the nature of the task.  It has been 
shown that identification can be more sensitive than detection in revealing 
contralesional deficits (Baylis, Gore, Rodriguez & Shisler, 2001; Rafal, Danziger, 
Grossi, Machado & Ward, 2002; Olson, Stark & Chatterjee, 2003; Ricci, Genero, 
Colombatti, Zampieri & Chatterjee, 2005) and that there is a difference in responses 
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by extinction patients when the two competing objects are different than when they 
are identical (Rafal, 1994).  With this in mind, CP’s responses to an identification 
task were explored in Experiment 5B.  The task was a partial replication of the first 
experiment reported by Humphreys et al. (2002) employing identical stimuli and 
exposure durations.  In order to reduce the length of testing sessions and minimise 
tiredness of the participant, the number of trials was reduced and there were no blank 
trials (i.e. trials in which a blank screen appeared with no stimuli displayed). 
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 4.3   Experiment 5B 
 
Participant 
Demographic and clinical data for Patient CP may be found in Table 4.1.1.   
 
Apparatus 
Apparatus was identical to that reported in Experiment 5A.  Testing took 
place in a room with no natural light; an overhead light with a constant brightness 
remained on for all testing sessions.   
 
Stimuli 
A grey fixation cross, 1cm high and wide, was displayed in the centre of the 
screen against a white background, followed 150ms later by stimulus onset.  Stimuli 
were grey against a white background and an example of an experimental trial is 
depicted in Figure 4.2.2.  Luminance (cd/m
2
) and settings of the background and 
stimuli can be found in Table 4.2.2.   Partially replicating a study by Humphreys et al. 
(2002), stimuli consisted of letters drawn from the set A, B, C and D, presented at 
about 5° from point of fixation.  Each letter was in Times New Roman font and 
measured 0.69° wide x 0.69° high.  Letters appeared randomly, either unilaterally to 
the left or right of fixation, or bilaterally (one left and one right).  In bilateral displays, 
the two letters were never the same.  Letters remained on the screen for four different 
durations: 150, 300, 450 and 600 msec. The different stimulus durations were 
presented in separate trial blocks.  In line with the study reported by Humphreys et al. 
(2002), there were more trials displayed for 150msec than for the other three stimulus 
durations: there two blocks of 48 trials (24 two-stimulus, 12 one-left and 12 one-right 
trials) with stimulus durations of 150 msec and one block of 48 trials with each of the 
remaining three stimulus durations (a total of 240 trials).  The order of the blocks was 
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randomised.  Prior to the experimental trials there was a short practice session 
consisting of 12 trials with stimulus durations of 150 msec. 
 
 
Figure 4.2.2: A schematic representation of an experimental trial.  In each trial, a central fixation 
cross appeared on the screen, followed after 150ms by a stimulus event (in this example stimuli appear 
in both left and right visual fields).   
 
 
 
Procedure   
Eye movements were monitored by an assistant seated behind the computer 
screen.  The patient was aware that his eye movements were being monitored, and he 
was instructed to re-fixate whenever an eye shift occurred.  If fixation deviated from 
the centre of the screen that trial was excluded from the final analysis.  Each trial 
began with the onset of the central fixation cross.  There followed a blank interval of 
150ms and then the stimulus display.  The patient made verbal responses, reporting 
the letter on the left and the letter on the right of the screen and keyboard responses 
were made by the experimenter.  A response of “A on the left and B on the right”, for 
example, would be entered by a second experimenter (the author) as ‘AB’; a response 
of “Nothing on the left and B on the right” would be entered as ‘0B’.  The entry of 
each response initiated the next trial.  
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Results 
 
 Data are presented in Table 4.2.2. 
 
Table 4.2.2:  Mean errors in single left and double trials 
 
Stimulus 
Duration 
% Errors 
Single Left 
Trials 
% Left 
Errors in  
Double 
Trials 
Error 
Trend 
p-value 
150 msec 
300 msec 
450 msec 
600 msec 
25% 
13% 
13% 
13% 
50% 
50% 
38% 
25% 
Extinction 
Extinction 
Extinction 
Extinction 
ns  
ns      <.05 combined 
ns 
ns          
 
There was a trend towards extinction, which failed to reach significance in 
any of the individual stimulus durations.  However, when the three shorter stimulus 
durations were combined a significant pattern of extinction emerged (χ2 (1) = 4.95, p 
= .026).  Data are presented in Figure 4.2.3. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4.2.3: The percentage of left errors made by CP in the identification task at stimulus   
durations of 150, 300, 450 and 600 msec. 
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Discussion  
 CP showed clear anti-extinction in a simple detection task when exposures 
were brief, but performed at ceiling in longer stimulus durations trials.  The anti-
extinction pattern of errors found at 100 msec in the detection task can be explained 
by the suggestion made earlier in relation to healthy individuals, which is that 
attention was initially focused in ipsilesional space awaiting a stimulus event.  If one 
appeared then it was processed and attention was free to be shifted to contralesional 
space.  If no ipsilesional stimulus appeared, then attention remained in the ipsilesional 
field awaiting a stimulus, only to be shifted to contralesional space too late for a brief 
contralesional event to be detected. When an identification task was performed, 
probably requiring more top-down processes, he showed a trend towards extinction at 
all stimulus durations which, when the three shorter durations were combined, did 
reach significance.   
Interestingly, Figure 4.2.3 shows that leftward errors in double trials 
decreased as exposure durations increased, whilst errors in single left trials, despite 
being low, remained constant.  It might be that, had there been longer exposure 
durations, the anticipated switch from extinction to anti-extinction could have 
occurred, resulting in a crossover of the data lines in Figure 4.2.3.  It was, 
unfortunately, not possible to retest CP to explore this possibility.  
  CP’s performance seems in line with Goodrich and Ward’s account of their 
patient VH, who showed anti-extinction on both detection and identification tasks; 
however it is clearly in contrast with Humphreys et al.’s patient GK, whose 
performance with bilateral stimuli worsen while exposure of stimuli increased.  
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  In order to explore further the responses of the three patients identified as 
showing extinction in the simple detection task, the same identification task used with 
CP was undertaken.   
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4.4 Experiment 6 
 
Introduction 
 
Experiments 5A and B tested a patient who had shown anti-extinction on the 
initial detection task and a trend towards extinction on the identification task. 
Crucially, his error pattern was not seen to change from extinction to anti-extinction 
with longer exposure durations on the identification task.  However, data suggested 
that this may have been the case if there had been trials with durations longer than 
600msec.With this in mind, the current experiment sought to explore with a similar 
task the error patterns of three patients who had shown extinction on initial tests, but 
the range of stimulus durations was broadened to include briefer (75 msec) and longer 
(750 msec and 900 msec) durations. 
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Method 
 
Participants 
 
Patients HH, WW and JJ took part in Experiment 6; their clinical and 
demographic details are reported in Table 4.1.1, and reconstructions of their brain 
lesions have been also added in Figure 4.3.1. All three patients showed evidence of 
visual extinction on previous extinction tasks (see Experiment 4).  Additional data 
from prior assessments on a number of tests are reported below: 
HH performed well on the Mini Mental State Exam (MMSE) obtaining 30 out 
of 30.  She showed evidence of neglect on the Bell Cancellation tests (omitting 5 left 
targets) and on the Copying task (missing the left side of 2 figures).  
WW performed well on the MMSE obtaining 28 out of 30.  He showed only 
very mild neglect on the Bell Cancellation test (omitting 5 left and 2 right targets) and 
mild neglect on the Copying task for one figure.  
JJ showed neglect on the Star Cancellation test (omitting 26 left targets and 9 
right targets) and on copying of all 3 figures.   
Stimuli 
Identification task: The apparatus and viewing conditions were identical to 
those reported for the previous test used with CP; however, as in Humphreys et al.’s 
(2002) study, stimulus duration ranged from 75 msec to 900 msec with seven 
durations in total (75, 150, 300, 450, 600, 750 and 900 msec) and with the different 
stimulus durations presented in separate trial blocks. Also in line with Humphreys et 
al.’s (2002) study, there were more trials displayed for the 150 msec duration than for 
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the other six stimulus durations: there were two blocks of 48 trials (24 bilateral, 12 
unilateral left; 12 unilateral right trials) with stimulus durations of 150 msec and one 
block of 48 trials with each of the remaining six stimulus durations, giving a total of 
384 stimuli. The order of the resulting 8 blocks was randomised. Prior to the 
experimental trials there was a short practice session consisting of 12 trials with 
stimulus durations of 150 msec.  
 
Procedure 
Patients made verbal responses (for example, “A on the left and C on the 
right”). The entry, by the examiner, of each response initiated the next trial.  
 
 
Results 
All three patients performed at ceiling or close to ceiling in identification of 
right visual stimuli on unilateral (error rate ranging from 0 to 3% for all patients) and 
bilateral trials (error rate ranging from 0 to 8% for HH and WW, and from 0% to 25% 
for JJ), whereas identification of left visual stimuli on unilateral and bilateral trials 
was poorer (Table 4.3.1). The vast majority of errors consisted of errors of omission. 
Individual Fisher’s exact tests analyses were carried out for each patient and each 
duration on identification error rates for left stimuli on unilateral trials (‘left 
unilateral’) and bilateral trials (‘left bilateral’). Results from all three patients are 
reported in Figure 4.3.1.  
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Figure 4.3.1: Errors (%) of HH, WW and JJ and GK (Humphreys et al., 2002) on unilateral and 
bilateral trials; CT scans of HH, WW and JJ. [From Watling   et al., in press) 
 
Patient HH showed extinction at shorter stimulus durations, reaching 
significance on a Fisher’s exact test at 150 msec (p <.05) and anti-extinction for 
stimulus durations of 300 msec and longer (with the exception of 600 msec; Figure 
4.3.1). At 750 msec and 900 msec this pattern of anti-extinction reached significance 
(p < .005 and  p< .05, respectively).   
The changeover from extinction at short exposure durations to anti-extinction 
at longer durations appears to have been driven by a decrease in left bilateral 
identification errors with increasing exposure duration, whereas performance on 
unilateral left trials remained relatively constant across all durations (Figure 4.3.1). 
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Indeed, Spearman’s correlations between duration of stimuli and error rate indicated a 
significant negative correlation for bilateral stimuli (r = -.917; p <.005), but only a 
weak, non-significant, correlation with unilateral stimuli (r = .018; p= .919; ns). 
Patient WW’s identification of left stimuli was close to ceiling for unilateral 
left trials, therefore a changeover from extinction to anti-extinction could not be 
observed even though the patient’s identification of left stimuli in in bilateral trials 
improved with longer stimulus durations (Figure 4.3.1). In bilateral trials, he showed 
a significant pattern of extinction for shorter stimulus durations (reaching significance 
on a Fisher’s exact test at 75, 150 and 450 msec), while no extinction was found with 
stimulus durations longer than 600 msec.  Spearman’s correlations between duration 
of stimuli and error rate with bilateral stimuli indicated a significant negative 
correlation (r = -.818; p<.05).  
Patient JJ showed a very similar pattern to that of HH. Indeed, JJ showed 
extinction with shorter stimulus durations and anti-extinction with longer stimulus 
durations (Figure 4.3.1).  JJ’s error rate for identification of left stimuli on bilateral 
and unilateral trials was significantly different on a Fisher’s exact test different at 75, 
150 and 300 msec, showing clear evidence of extinction for these stimulus durations. 
For stimulus durations of 600 msec and greater, he performed better with bilateral 
than unilateral displays. Despite the fact that differences between single and bilateral 
trials did not reach significance for any individual longer stimulus duration, a 
difference approaching significance was found when longer (i.e., 600, 750 and 900 
msec) exposures durations were considered together (χ² = 3.491; 2-tailed p=.062). 
As was the case for HH, increasing the stimulus duration mainly reduced JJ’s 
error rate for the left bilateral condition, whereas it had a negligible effect on left 
unilateral trials. In other words, the trend for a change from extinction to anti-
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extinction was mainly due to an improvement of performance in bilateral trials. 
Indeed, Spearman’s correlations between stimulus duration and error rate indicated a 
significant negative correlation for bilateral trials (r = -.873; p <.01) and a weak, non-
significant, correlation for unilateral trials (r = .371; p = .413; ns). 
 
Discussion 
All three patients showed an extinction pattern of errors at shorter exposure 
durations and two patients (HH and JJ) also showed an anti-extinction pattern for 
longer exposure durations. For all three patients, performance on bilateral trials 
showed significant improvement as exposure duration increased (Figure 4.3.1).  
In contrast with Goodrich and Ward’s (1997) prediction, these patients 
showed both extinction and anti-extinction when the same task was required. The 
current findings suggest that anti-extinction may not be as rare a phenomenon as 
previously thought when temporal-exposure duration is taken into account. Indeed, 
like Humphreys and colleagues’ (2002) patient GK, patients JJ and HH showed both 
extinction and anti-extinction depending on exposure duration. Humphreys and 
colleagues (2002) suggested that binding occurs when stimuli have common onsets, 
but that this binding effect is transient and only enhances performance for briefly 
presented stimuli. When stimuli remain in the field for longer durations the authors 
suggested that there is a decay in the tag that binds the stimuli, resulting in poorer 
performance. Within this theoretical framework, one would predict that anti-
extinction should occur with brief stimulus durations, whereas extinction should 
occur at longer durations. However, two patients (JJ and HH) reported here showed 
better performance in detecting contralesional stimuli on bilateral trials when the 
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stimulus duration was longer, and all three patients showed extinction (not anti-
extinction) for shorter durations.  
Thus, a novel ‘attentional waiting’ hypothesis is suggested. Due to brain 
damage, patients’ spatial bias dictated that attention was mainly drawn to the 
ipsilesional side. Despite this bias, on a proportion of unilateral trials the 
contralesional stimuli were able to capture sufficient attentional resources to be 
identified; on the remaining trials, however, attention waited indefinitely on the 
unilateral side. Therefore, longer duration of the contralesional stimulus should not 
have a great impact on patients’ performance on unilateral trials but only on bilateral 
trials.  Indeed, on bilateral trials with longer exposure durations, the prompt 
identification of the ipsilesional stimulus allowed attention to shift to the 
contralesional side in time to permit the identification of the contralesional target 
before it disappeared. Taking all these considerations into account, patients’ 
performance expressed itself as better identification of contralesional stimuli on 
bilateral than unilateral trials, that is anti-extinction, but only for longer durations. 
According to the ‘attentional waiting’ hypothesis, anti-extinction would, 
however, be replaced with extinction when shorter exposure durations are used. In 
such cases, there would be insufficient time before stimuli are removed to disengage 
from an ipsilesional stimulus and shift attention towards a contralesional target. 
Consistent with the notion of attention being firmly rooted in ipsilesional space and 
the difficulty in releasing attention from ipsilesional space, Karnath (1988) reported 
that contralesional errors in extinction patients are reduced when there is a 
requirement to report the contralesional item first, or to report only the contralesional 
item. 
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Additionally, according to the ‘attentional waiting’ hypothesis, exposure 
duration should exert a strong effect on bilateral trials but have much less, if any, 
effect on correct detection of contralesional unilateral trials. Interestingly, careful 
inspection of HH’s and JJ’s error rates showed just this. In contrast, Humphreys et 
al.’s patient GK showed the opposite pattern, with a stronger beneficial effect of 
stimulus duration for contralesional unilateral trials than for bilateral trials (Figure 
4.3.1). Indeed, analysing GK's data for the current study, a strongly significant 
correlation (Spearman’s correlation) was found between duration of stimuli and errors 
in contralesional unilateral trials (r = -.964; p < .001), whereas the correlation 
between duration of stimuli and bilateral trials was very weak (r = .571; p = .180; ns). 
Considering data from the patients reported here and from GK, it is suggested that 
different mechanisms underlie the anti-extinction in the patients reported here and 
GK’s anti-extinction. HH, WW and JJ mainly showed a rightward attentional bias 
(Corbetta, Kincade, Lewis, Snyder, & Sapir, 2005), whereas GK is known to be 
simultanagnosic (Boutsen & Humphreys, 1999). It is therefore likely that while GK 
might eventually, with increasing exposure duration, have been able to shift his 
attention from an empty location, he would have remained engaged on an occupied 
location. As a result, for GK longer exposure durations would result in better 
performance for single stimuli but would have little effect on bilateral presentations 
where one stimulus would monopolise attention. Therefore, while different patients 
may show a better performance in processing contralesional stimuli when displayed 
simultaneously with an ipsilesional one, the underlying causes may be very different 
and may lead to further fractionation of anti-extinction in different phenomena. A 
novel ‘attentional waiting’ hypothesis is proposed, which implies a main underlying 
rightward bias in spatial processing and we propose that anti-extinction with longer 
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exposure durations may be observed in larger proportion of patients showing 
extinction if duration of stimuli is increased. 
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4.5   Summary and General Discussion    
 
Of the nine patients initially tested, three showed extinction and one showed 
anti-extinction on a preliminary detection task. A further two patients showed 
evidence of anti-extinction on identification tasks. Experiments with clinical 
population suggest that visual attention may be distributed across the visual field in 
quite different ways depending on the type of task and underlying cognitive processes 
required. A novel hypothesis, the ‘attentional waiting’ hypothesis has been proposed 
to explain occurrence of extinction and anti-extinction. The hypothesis proposes that 
because of the shift of attention towards ipsilesional space in brain damaged patients, 
a stimulus in the right visual field is awaited and attention remains rooted there until 
the appearance of one.  Despite the fact that the contralesional target may be able to 
still capture sufficient attentional resources to be identified occasionally, in most 
cases attention waits indefinitely on the unilateral side if no stimulus appears. 
Therefore, longer duration of the contralesional stimulus should not affect patients’ 
performance on unilateral trials but only on bilateral trials.  Indeed, on bilateral trials 
with longer exposure durations, the appearance of an ipsilesional stimulus allows 
attention to shift to the contralesional side in time to permit the identification of the 
contralesional target before it disappears.  Thus, in the study reported herein, anti-
extinction (better identification of contralesional stimuli on bilateral than unilateral 
trials) was observed, but only for longer durations. According to the ‘attentional 
waiting’ hypothesis, anti-extinction would be replaced with extinction in shorter 
exposure durations. In bilateral displays with short exposure durations, there would 
not be enough time to disengage attention from an ipsilesional stimulus and shift 
attention towards a contralesional one.  
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Finally, it seems that anti-extinction may be a less rare phenomenon than 
thought; indeed it may well have escaped report by a large number of researchers due 
to an assumption that if performance on single contralesional stimuli is poor, it would 
necessarily follow that performance on double simultaneous stimuli would be poorer 
still.   
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Chapter 5                                           
Summary, conclusions and suggestions for 
future research 
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5.1 Summary and conclusions 
Many theories of attention (e.g. Broadbent, 1958; Duncan, 1980; Treisman, 
1969, Desimone & Duncan, 1995) share the assumption that the myriad of visual 
stimuli that surround us compete for perceptual attention in a limited capacity 
cognitive system.  As a result of this competition the winning stimuli are processed 
and the losing items fail to reach conscious awareness.  The competitive nature of this 
process is aptly demonstrated in the neurological condition of visual extinction.  This 
thesis has focused on the competitive nature of visual stimuli and its effects on early 
visual processing.  In recreating in healthy volunteers an extinction-like pattern of 
errors similar to that observed in patients who show extinction and anti-extinction 
some insights have been gained into the conditions that mediate these error patterns. 
The experiments reported in the present thesis fall into three categories: 
Chapter 2 reports three experiments that simulated extinction in healthy volunteers 
using a bottom-up, stimulus driven paradigm. Of these, the first two experiments 
employed a simple detection task and the third a more demanding identification task.    
The experiment reported in Chapter 3 employed a top-down, cueing paradigm using 
an identification task and Chapter 4 reports findings with extinction patients.  The fact 
that extinction can reliably be simulated by manipulation of stimulus events provides 
support for the notion of the competitive aspect of visual processing in healthy 
individuals, indeed it has been suggested that extinction is simply an exaggerated 
form of a normal attentional limitation (de Haan & Rorden, 2004; Ptak & Schnider, 
2005). Whilst extinction has been temporarily induced in healthy volunteers with 
transcranial magnetic stimulation (e.g. Pascual-Leone et al., 1994), only a few papers 
have attempted to investigate this phenomenon in healthy volunteers (e.g. Gorea & 
Sagi, 2002). 
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In Chapter 2 it was found that, in experiments where participants simply had 
to detect the presence of a stimulus, extinction-like errors ensue when the two stimuli 
in bilateral presentation differ in luminance, the brighter one extinguishing its less 
bright counterpart resulting in more errors in bilateral than in unilateral displays.  
Moreover, despite several attempts to uncover any possible bias towards one or other 
visual field none was found.  However, when the task was a more demanding one of 
identification, an interesting pattern of anti-extinction emerged. This apparent 
advantage in reporting a weaker stimulus when it appeared in a bilateral display with 
a stronger item rather than when it appeared alone directly opposes what might be 
expected in extinction.   
The qualitative different performance observed following identification and 
detection tasks may be debatable as it cannot be excluded that these two tasks may be 
at the extreme of one attentional continuum, where different types of responses may 
be recorded depending on various aspects of the task. For example, Goodrich and 
Ward (1997) observed anti-extinction also in detection tasks, whereas patient CP 
reported in this thesis, showed anti-extinction on detection tasks where duration of 
stimuli was higher than those in the identification tasks. Finally, Humphreys et al.’s 
(2002) patient GK showed both extinction and anti-extinction by means of 
identification tasks and this patient’s pattern of data were more easily explained in 
terms of binding process and associated simultagnosia. It seems therefore difficult to 
reconcile all observations of extinction and anti-extinction in the literature to the same 
explanation and to a parallel with a distinction between detection and identification.  
However, it must be considered that identification requires retrieval of semantic 
information of stimuli, and identification of stimuli may indeed rely more on top-
down mechanisms than does detection. With this in mind, Experiment 4 (Chapter 3) 
was designed to test whether a pattern of extinction or one of anti-extinction would be 
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observed in healthy volunteers in an experiment which employed a cueing paradigm, 
and which presented the same stimuli used in Experiment 3 (shapes that had to be 
identified).  Again, a pattern of anti-extinction was observed, in which detection of an 
invalidly cued stimulus was more likely when it appeared simultaneously with a 
validly cued one than when it appeared alone.   
Scrutiny of the literature revealed that this pattern had been found in two 
patients with right hemisphere damage and reported in two articles (Goodrich & 
Ward, 1997; Humphreys et al., 2002, see also Riddoch, Rappaport & Humphreys, 
2009 for a review).  These authors suggested that anti-extinction is either triggered by 
similar task demands (Goodrich & Ward, 1997) or by temporal binding between pairs 
of stimuli over a short period of time, but not with more prolonged stimulus durations  
(Humphreys et al., 2002).  Goodrich and Ward’s interpretation may account for the 
healthy volunteers’ extinction and anti-extinction pattern of errors; indeed, extinction-
like responses were found with detection task whereas anti-extinction pattern was 
found with identification task. However, the type of task was the same within the 
same experiment and for both stimuli. Alternatively,   a novel ‘waiting’ hypothesis, 
could be considered (Watling, Danckert, Linnell & Cocchini., in press). It suggests 
that when a stimulus appears in the cued location, attention is directed to it and then 
immediately transferred to the opposite field where a simultaneous item can be 
processed.  If, however, no stimulus appears in the cued space, then attentional 
resources remain there for longer and disengage to the opposite field too late for a 
brief stimulus to be attended.  Some supporting evidence can be found in a series of 
studies on temporal order judgments (TOJs; e.g., Stelmach & Herdman, 1991). These  
studies show that stimuli are perceived as simultaneous if the unattended stimulus 
precedes the attended one by up to 40 msec in healthy volunteers.  Similar effects 
have been found in brain damaged patients, who tend to perceive ipsilesional stimuli 
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as preceding the contralesional ones by up to 250 msec (Rorden, Mattingley, Karnath 
& Driver, 1997; Geeraerts, Lafosse, Vandenbussche & Verfaillie, 2010 ). 
In order to explore this phenomenon further, Chapter 4 reports two 
experiments (Experiments 5a and b and 6) with patients who have right hemisphere 
damage and have shown clinical evidence of neglect and extinction, thus their 
attention was drawn towards stronger targets due to a cognitive deficit, rather than an 
external cue.  In Experiment 6 two of them, JJ and HH, are reported to have shown 
better performance in detecting contralesional stimuli in double trials when stimulus 
duration was longer.  Despite a clear role of exposure of stimuli, these finding are in 
clear contrast with Humphreys et al.’s temporal binding hypothesis with the opposite 
pattern of performance.  Following the ‘waiting’ hypothesis  previously proposed to 
account for healthy volunteers’ pattern of data, a similar account could explain anti-
extinction in patients HH and JJ.  When stimulus duration was brief there was 
insufficient time on bilateral trials to disengage attention from the ipsilesional 
stimulus and shift it towards the contralesional one, but when stimuli remained in 
view for longer, attention was freed to shift to the contralesional field in time to 
process a second stimulus.  This interpretation is particularly interesting if one 
considers that previous studies have reported that patients tend to perceive 
contralesional stimuli much later than ipsilesional stimuli (as in TOJ studies) and that 
difficulty in disengagement of attention from ipsilesional stimuli has also been 
reported (e.g. Karnath, 1988). But how can this explanation account also for 
extinction with brief stimulus durations and within the same task? It is possible that, 
despite the bias towards the ipsilesional side dictated by the brain lesion, in a 
proportion of unilateral trials, the single contralesional stimuli were still able to 
capture sufficient attentional resources to be identified. On remaining trials, however, 
attention waited for an indefinite time on the ipsilesional side. Longer duration of the 
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contralesional stimulus did have no great impact on patients’ performance on 
unilateral trials but only on bilateral trials. Indeed, on bilateral trials with longer 
exposure durations, the prompt identification of the ipsilesional stimulus allowed 
attention to shift to the contralesional side in time to permit the identification of the 
contralesional target before it disappeared. Taking all these considerations into 
account, patients’ performance expressed itself as better identification of 
contralesional stimuli on bilateral than unilateral trials, that is anti-extinction, but only 
for longer durations (Watling et al., 2013). 
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5.2 Future Directions 
The experimental work in this thesis successfully addressed a number of 
issues relating to attentional competition, extinction and anti-extinction.  Moreover, 
several interesting questions for future research have arisen from the results herein.    
Firstly, it would seem reasonable to conclude that anti-extinction is more 
prevalent than is currently reported in the literature.  As an attentional phenomenon 
that seems to be determined by stimulus properties, much can be learned from 
patients who show anti-extinction and further research would be of interest.  Three 
conflicting accounts have now been proposed to account for the particular pattern of 
errors which, at first sight, seems at odds with the notion that multiple stimuli 
compete for attention in a limited capacity system.  Goodrich and Ward (1997) 
suggested that task demands play a role in extinction and anti-extinction; their patient 
showed anti-extinction on tasks of simple detection and in identification tasks, but not 
when required to identify stimuli in one field and to detect stimuli in the other.  They 
suggest that a priming effect is triggered by a task-specific response mechanism, 
which results in the processing of a contralesional stimulus and that, if a patient 
showing extinction were to carry out a task requiring both detection and 
identification, the extinction pattern of errors would become more pronounced.  It 
seems not to be the case that there are some patients who show extinction and others 
who show anti-extinction, but that patients with right hemisphere damage may well 
show both patterns of errors in different tasks, and it would be interesting to test 
Goodrich and Ward’s interpretation with more patients.  Certainly there is evidence in 
the literature to suggest that tasks of simple detection and those requiring 
identification elicit different responses because they place different levels of demand 
on the cognitive system.  Kanwisher’s token individuation hypothesis (Kanwisher, 
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1987; 1991) accounted for the phenomenon of repetition blindness (the inability to 
report the identity of a visual stimulus that is repeated shortly after an earlier 
presentation of the same stimulus) by making a distinction between type recognition 
(recognition of a single property such as colour) and token individuation (assigning 
an identity); type recognition is less cognitively demanding and therefore possible 
under conditions of rapid serial visual presentation, whereas token individuation is 
not.  Baylis, Driver and Rafal (1993) used the token individuation hypothesis to 
explain the finding that stimulus similarity leads to increased extinction in 
identification tasks  (Baylis et al, 1993; Vuilleumier & Rafal, 1999; 2000), but not in 
detection tasks (Gilchrist, Humphreys & Riddoch, 1996; Humphreys, 1998; 
Pavlovskaya et al., 1997; Ward et al., 1994).  Moreover, the current study found 
differences in performance of patients in these two types of tasks, with patient CP, for 
example, showing anti-extinction in a detection task on brief stimulus exposure, and a 
trend towards extinction in a detection task in all exposure durations.  There is 
therefore much evidence to suggest that manipulation of task demands and exposure 
durations influence competition between stimuli and many further studies with 
patients could be undertaken to explore the interplay between these factors. 
The visual confrontation test (Bender & Teuber, 1946) is still commonly  
reported as a tool for the assessment of extinction.  The findings in Experiment 5 
suggest that this task is less effective in assessing visual extinction than a 
computerised detection task.  Both tasks were administered to nine patients and, 
whilst four patients did not show extinction in either task, the visual confrontation 
task failed to detect extinction in one patient and, importantly in the context of the 
current findings, also failed to detect anti-extinction in a second patient; the error 
patterns became apparent in the more sensitive computerised detection task.  It is 
acknowledged that the sample of patients was small and a larger scale study would be 
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essential in determining the usefulness of both tests and possibly in designing an 
improved version of the computerised test that could be more widely used with, or 
instead of, the visual confrontation test. This may lead to a better understanding of the 
actual incidence of anti-extinction in right hemisphere damage patients which, in turn, 
could lead to new interpretations of attentional processes.  
Finally, future studies may address the ‘waiting’ hypothesis by means of 
asynchronous presentation of bilateral stimuli to closely monitor the relationship 
between attention shift and duration of stimuli. 
The work in this thesis has shown that it is possible to create a reliable pattern 
of extinction errors in healthy participants by creating an imbalance of strength 
between the stimuli in both visual fields, either by bottom-up or top-down processes.  
When the complexity of task demands, and duration of stimuli, is increased from 
detection to identification, a pattern of anti-extinction can be seen.  Anti-extinction 
was also observed in brain damaged patients and a novel ‘attentional waiting 
hypothesis’ was proposed to account for these findings. Despite extensive 
progress in understanding the mechanisms that underlie extinction and related 
attentional disorders, much still remains to be learned about the processes of 
attentional competition and selection.  It is hoped that the work in this  thesis has 
added to the evolving body of knowledge in the area and that it has also raised some 
interesting possibilities for future research. 
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Appendix A: 
 
A publication in Neuropsychology arising from the work reported in this thesis is 
presented on pages 183-187. 
 
 
 
